Preamble

The House met at Eleven of the Clock, Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.

CLERK OF THE HOUSE (RETIRE MENT OF SIR HORACE DAWKINS).

Mr. SPEAKER acquainted the House that he had received a letter from Sir Horace Christian Dawkins, K.C.B., M.B.E., the Clerk of the House, which Mr. SPEAKER read as followeth:

Sir, 30th July, 1937.

I have the honour to inform you that, after forty-six years in the service of this House, nineteen of which have been spent at the Table, I desire to resign the Patent of Clerk of the House of Commons which I have been proud to hold for the last seven years.

It is with great regret that I leave the service of the House and I should like to express to you, Sir, and to all Members of the House in this and previous Parliaments, as well as to all my colleagues, my sincere gratitude for the unfailing kindness and courtesy shown to me, and also to express a hope that the performance of my duties in this high and honourable Office has met with the approval of those whom it has been my privilege to serve to the best of my abilities.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

HORACE C. DAWKINS.

To the Right Honourable The Speaker.

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Date when Closure moved, and by whom.
Question before House or Committee when moved.
Whether in House or Committee.
Whether assent given to Motion or withheld by Speaker or Chairman.
Assent withheld because, in the opinion of the Chair, a decision would shortly be arrived at without that Motion.
Result of Motion and if a Division, Numbers for and against.

and (2) in the Standing Committees under the following heads:


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Date when Closure moved, and by whom.
Question before Committee when moved.
Whether assent given to Motion or withheld by Chairman.
Assent withheld because, in the opinion of the Chair, a decision would shortly be arrived at without that Motion.
Result of Motion and if a Division, Numbers for and against.

—[The Deputy-Chairman.]

PRIVATE BILLS AND PRIVATE BUSINESS.

Return ordered,
of the number of Private Bills, Hybrid Bills, Bills for confirming Provisional Orders, and Bills for confirming Schemes under the Public Works Facilities Act, 1930, introduced into

The Prime Minister (Mr. Chamberlain): The House will have heard with very great regret the terms of the letter which you, Sir, have read to us. I will not say anything further about the contents of the letter at this moment, but I desire to give notice that when we meet again I shall, in accordance with precedent, move a Motion expressing the thanks of this House to Sir Horace Dawkins for his long service to us.

NOTICES OF MOTIONS (RETURNS ETC.).

ADJOURNMENT MOTIONS UNDER STANDING ORDER No. 8.

Return ordered,
of Motions for Adjournment under Standing Order No. 8, showing the date of such Motion, the name of the Member proposing, the definite matter of urgent public importance, and the result of any Division taken thereon, during Session 1936–37.—[The Deputy-Chairman.]

CLOSURE OF DEBATE (STANDING ORDER No. 26).

Return ordered,
respecting application of Standing Order No. 26 (Closure of Debate) during Session 1936–37 (1) in the House and in Committee of the whole House, under the following heads:
the House of Commons and brought from the House of Lords, and of Acts passed in Session 1936–37:
Of all the Private Bills, Hybrid Bills, and Bills for confirming Provisional Orders which in Session 1936–37 have been reported on by Committees on Opposed Private Bills or by


Committees nominated partly by the House and partly by the Committee of Selection, together with the names of the selected Members who served on each Committee; the first and also the last day of the sitting of each Committee; the number of days on which each Committee sat; the number of days on which each selected Member has served; the number of days occupied by each Bill in Committee; the Bills the Preambles of which were reported to have been proved; the Bills the Preambles of which were reported to have been not proved; and, in the case of Bills for confirming Provisional Orders, whether the Provisional Orders ought or ought not to be confirmed:
Of all Private Bills and Bills for confirming Provisional Orders which, in Session 1936–37, have been referred by the Committee of Selection to the Committee on Unopposed Bills, together with the names of the Members who served on the Committee; the number of days on which the Committee sat; and the number of days on which each Member was summoned and on which each Member attended:
And, of the number of Private Bills, Hybrid Bills, Bills for confirming Provisional Orders, and Bills for confirming Schemes under the Public Works Facilities Act, 1930, withdrawn or not proceeded with by the parties, those Bills being specified which have been referred to Committees and dropped during the sittings of the Committee."—[The Deputy-Chairman.]

PUBLIC BILLS.

Return ordered,
of the number of Public Bills, distinguishing Government from other Bills, introduced into this House, or brought from the House of Lords, during Session 1936–37; showing the number which received the Royal Assent; the number which were passed by this House, but not by the House of Lords; the number passed by the House of Lords, but not by this House; and distinguishing the stages at which such Bills as did not receive the Royal Assent were dropped or postponed and rejected in either House of Parliament."—[The Deputy-Chairman.]

PUBLIC PETITIONS.

Return ordered,
of the number of Public Petitions presented and printed in Session 1936–37, with the total number of signatures in that Session."—[The Deputy-Chairman.]

SELECT COMMITTEES.

Return ordered,
of the number of Select Committees appointed in Session 1936–37, the Chairmen's Panel, and the Court of Referees; the subjects of inquiry; the names of the Members appointed to serve on each, and of the Chairman of each; the number of days each Committee met, and the number of days each Member attended; the total expense of the attendance of witnesses at each Select Committee, and the name of the Member who moved for such Select Committee; also the total number of Members who served on Select Committees."—[The Deputy-Chairman.]

SITTINGS OF THE HOUSE AND BUSINESS OF SUPPLY.

Return ordered,
of (1) the days on which the House sat in Session 1936–37, staring for each day the date of the month and day of the week, the hour of the meeting, and the hour of adjournment; and the total number of hours occupied in the Sittings of the House, and the average time; and showing the number of hours on which the House sat each day, and the number of hours after 11 p.m.; and the number of entries in each day's Votes and Proceedings; and (2) the days on which Business of Supply was considered.—[The Deputy-Chairman.]

STANDING COMMITTEES.

Return ordered,
for Session 1936–37 of (1) the total number and the names of all Members (including and distinguishing Chairmen) who have been appointed to serve on one or more of the five Standing Committees appointed under Standing Order No. 47, showing with regard to each of such Members, the number of sittings to which he was summoned and at which he was present; (2) the number of Bills considered by all and by each of the Standing Committees, the number of days on which each Committee sat, and the names of all Bills considered by a Standing Committee, distinguishing where a Bill was a Government Bill or was brought from the House of Lords, and showing, in the case of each Bill, the particular Standing Committee by whom it was considered, the number of days on which it was considered by the Committee, and the number of Members present on each of those days."—[The Deputy-Chairman.]

Oral Answers to Questions — CEYLON (PUBLIC OFFICERS' ASSOCIATIONS).

Mr. Ammon: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies, whether he is aware that associations of employés in the Ceylon Government service are discouraged and that, even when permitted in modified form, a copy of the minutes of all meetings of associations of public officers must be forwarded to the head of the department; and whether he will supply information as to whether such action accords with official instructions.

The Under-Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs (Marquess of Hartington): I have been asked to reply. In the Ceylon Public Service Regulations it is provided that the formation of any association of public officers requires the


previous sanction of the Chief Secretary, and that a copy of the minutes of all meetings of associations of public servants must be forwarded to the Head of the Department concerned. My right honourable Friend is not aware that such associations are discouraged in Ceylon.

Mr. Ammon: Would it not be better to follow the practice of the Civil Service at home, and permit these associations to function without official interference?

Oral Answers to Questions — ABYSSINIAN REFUGEES.

Miss Rathbone: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies, whether he will inform the House of the present position of refugees from Abyssinia in British colonial and mandated territory; what is the total number of refugees from Abyssinia, including women and children; whether this number is increasing; and in what manner the needs of the refugees in British territory are being met.

Marquess of Hartington: There are approximately the following numbers of Abyssinian refugees, including women and children, in Kenya, Somaliland, Aden, and Palestine:—

Kenya, 2,810 (exclusive of 485 deserters from the Italian army).

Somaliland, 1,348.

Aden, 32.

Palestine, 55.

Precise details are not available as to the exact number of women and children included in the above figures. It is not possible to say whether further numbers of refugees are likely to enter Kenya and Somaliland. No refugees have entered Somaliland since April, but a party of approximately 1,000 crossed into Kenya as recently as 13th July. The Governments of Kenya and Somaliland have made all necessary arrangements for the maintenance of the refugees in special refugee camps, while, in addition, financial assistance is being made available from unofficial sources for the purchase of clothing and simple comforts.

Oral Answers to Questions — TRANSPORT.

PEDESTRIAN CROSSING PLACES.

Lieut. - Colonel Moore - Brabazon: asked the Minister of Transport whether his notice has been called to a High Court

decision on regulations relative to pedestrians at beacon crossings; and whether he is satisfied with the position as it now stands or whether he intends to withdraw the present regulations and substitute others.

The Minister of Transport (Mr. Burgin): The answer to the first part of the Question is in the affirmative; to the second part that I am more satisfied with the regulations themselves than with the observance of their spirit by drivers or pedestrians; to the third part that I have no such intention at present, but am closely observing conditions.

Mr. Guy: Is is not the case that this decision has clarified the intention of the regulations?

Mr. H. G. Williams: Has the right hon. Gentleman's attention been drawn to the confusion that exists in the mind of pedestrians between controlled and uncontrolled crossings, so that they do not know exactly what their rights are?

STEEL RAILWAY COACHES.

Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher: asked the Minister of Transport, what is the proportion of all-steel coaches to wooden coaches employed on British railways as compared with French; whether he has any information indicating that the use of steel coaches minimises danger to life in accidents, enabling higher speeds to be maintained than with wooden coaches; if the progressive employment of steel coaches is accompanied by a diminution of fatal accidents on the railways; and whether the 75 per cent. of steel employed in British passenger rolling stock is employed in the chassis or bodywork construction.

Mr. Burgin: The information at my disposal does not enable me to make the comparison asked for in the first part of the Question. I have no evidence that the use of steel coaches has the results suggested in the second and third parts. As regards the last part, steel is employed in both the chassis and the bodywork.

Sir Percy Harris: Has the right hon. Gentleman seen the account of a very serious accident in France where steel coaches withstood the shock while wooden ones were destroyed?

Mr. Burgin: I have seen the report, but the whole question of steel coaches is


rather confusing. What we call wooden coaches in England are 75 per cent. steel.

POLICE (TRAFFIC DUTY).

Mr. Day: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what instructions are issued in regard to the relief of police officers performing traffic duty and posted at exposed points in severe weather?

The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Geoffrey Lloyd): The instructions to the Metropolitan Police are that during extremes of weather, either in summer or winter, constables posted to traffic duty are to be afforded relief by changing duty for at least two hours with constables on adjoining beats, provided that this can be arranged without detriment to the duties. In any special cases when constables are posted to duties which are unusually trying, further relief may be arranged.

Mr. Day: Do we understand that the times of relief are regularised?

Mr. Lloyd: This is a regular instruction.

Colonel Sandeman Allen: Are arrangements made for the relief of Ministers on day duty?

SPAIN.

Mr. Mander: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether, in view of the deadlock in the Non-Intervention Committee, he will consider the advisability of referring the situation in Spain to the League of Nations for action under the terms of the Covenant with a view to the definition as an aggressor of any country or countries held to be actively intervening by the landing of troops, and the taking of such collective action as may seem most practicable for preventing any further breach of Article 10 of the Covenant and for facilitating the withdrawal of foreign elements at present in Spain?

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Viscount Cranborne): The Chairman's Sub-Committee of the Non-Intervention Committee have, as the House is aware, invited the various Governments to submit their views in writing on the proposals put forward by

His Majesty's Government on 14th July. These replies are being considered by the Sub-Committee to-day. In the circumstances, I am not prepared to adopt the hon. Member's suggestion.

Mr. Mander: Is it not clear that the policy indicated in the Question is the only realistic way of dealing with this question from the point of view of those who believe in the League?

Viscount Cranborne: I am not prepared to accept the hon. Member's original assumption that a deadlock has been produced.

Mr. Petherick: Will my Noble Friend assure the House that the Government intend to continue their present peaceful policy even at the risk of disobliging some of the "pink" Jingoes on those benches?

Captain Cazalet: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, what steps have recently been taken by His Majesty's Government to facilitate the evacuation of non-combatants from Madrid?

Viscount Cranborne: As the result of the transport service organised by the Acting British Consul at Madrid with the assistance of the International Red Cross, and of the facilities provided by His Majesty's Ship "Maine," approximately 1,000 Spanish non-combatants have been evacuated to France from Madrid via Valencia during the present month.

Captain Cazalet: Can my hon. Friend say whether that number includes any women or children about whom I addressed a Question some time ago who are in prisons in Madrid?

Viscount Cranborne: I should like notice of that question, but it has been completely impartial as between the two parties.

Mr. W. Roberts: Have the Spanish Government facilitated this, and can the hon. Gentleman say whether, in view of that fact, General Franco will not facilitate the evacuation of refugee women and children from Santader?

Viscount Cranborne: Certainly, the Spanish Government have facilitated that, but the further question of the hon. Member rather goes beyond the present one.

Miss Rathbone: Is it not the fact that the representatives of the League at Geneva engaged in this work had the greatest difficulty in receiving reciprocal lists of people from General Franco whom he was willing to let go?

Viscount Cranborne: I should like notice of that question.

Mr. W. Roberts: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, in view of the repeated attacks upon Red Cross units in Spain, he will make it a conditions of granting belligerent rights to the insurgents that the Red Cross is in future respected.

Viscount Cranborne: No such attacks have been brought to my notice. The second part of the Question does not, therefore arise.

Mr. Wedgwood Benn: Would the noble Lord call shooting at a refugee ship such an attack?

Viscount Cranborne: I think that my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty said that there has been no case where a refugee ship has been shot at.

Mr. Benn: Then may I ask the noble Lord whether he has inquired from the captain of the ship what his views were about that ship.

Viscount Cranborne: That question should be put to the Admiralty.

Mr. W. Roberts: Has the attention of the hon. Gentleman been drawn to cases of shelling and bombing ambulances on the Madrid front?

Colonel Wedgwood: Has the hon. Gentleman any information as to the killing of Julian Bell?

Vice-Admiral Taylor: Is it not the fact that it is a perfectly simple matter for a man-of-war to fire a shot across the bows of a merchant ship without any possibility of hitting it?

Lieut.-Commander Fletcher: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, in view of the provisions of the clause in the Anglo-Italo Agreement relative to the preservation of the status quo in the Mediterranean, he will make representation to the Italian Government on the subject of the present action of Italy in Spain and the Mediterranean?

Viscount Cranborne: No, Sir; in addition to the provisions of the Anglo-Italian Declaration itself, the assurances given by the Italian Government regarding the integrity of the present territories of Spain which accompanied that Declaration, have more than once been renewed, the most recent occasion being within the last few days.

Miss Rathbone: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has taken, or will take, steps to demand from the Spanish insurgents the return of, or compensation for, any cargoes the property of British consignors which have been seized in ships captured by insurgent vessels off the Spanish coast; and whether the return of such cargoes has in fact been effected or promised?

Viscount Cranborne: Yes, Sir. The policy of His Majesty's Government is to make protests to either party in Spain against any illegal seizure of British property on the high seas whatever be the flag flown by the ship on which such property is carried. Where British cargoes have been illegally detained His Majesty's Government have taken all possible steps to secure their release, and have reserved their right to make claims for damage and loss sustained by British interests. His Majesty's Government will continue to press for satisfaction in all cases where this may be required.

POLAND (STABILISATION LOAN).

Sir John Mellor: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has any further information to give with regard to the partial default foreshadowed by the Polish Government upon the service of the Republic of Poland 7 per cent. Stabilisation Loan, sterling issue?

Viscount Cranborne: I understand that the matter has recently again been under discussion between representatives of the Polish Government and the Council of Foreign Bondholders.

Miss Rathbone: Have His Majesty's Government, in fact, received any reply from the insurgent authorities with regard to compensation or restoration of captured cargo in reply to their representations?

Viscount Cranborne: The position is admittedly unsatisfactory, but in the particular case of the "Mar Baltico," as the


House knows, the authorities promised to release the cargo, and arrangements are still in progress in regard to that affair, and are not completed yet.

Mr. Bellenger: Can the hon. Gentleman say whether, in fact, any compensation whatever, in cash or in kind, has been paid by General Franco up to the present?

Viscount Cranborne: Not yet.

HOSPITAL REORGANISATION (WED NESFIELD AND WILLENHALL).

Mr. Mander: asked the Minister of Health the present position with regard to the Staffordshire County Council's arrangements for dealing with old persons, public assistance applicants, and hospital contributors in Wednesfield and Willenhall?

The Minister of Health (Sir Kingsley Wood): I understand that the county council have given full consideration to the representations which have been made with regard to their scheme of hospital reorganisation and have decided to proceed with it.

Mr. Mander: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that, although arrangements have now been made for the hospital contributors to go to New Cross Hospital, there are still over 100 beds there available for public assistance applicants, and will he make further inquiries to see if any further arrangement can be made to make use of them?

Sir K. Wood: I will make further inquiries of the authorities, but as the hon. Member knows I have very fully considered this matter.

Mr. Hannah: Is the Minister aware that Bilston is also unhappy and discontented over this matter?

Sir K. Wood: I am sorry about that.

VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTORS ACT, 1937.

Mr. Tinker: asked the Minister of Health what method he is adopting to make known what the provisions of the Widows', Orphans', and Old Age Contributory Pensions (Voluntary Contribu-

tors) Act, 1937, are in relation to those between the ages of 40 and 55 years who join during the 12 months from the commencement of the Act?

Sir K. Wood: A booklet has been prepared in popular form entitled "The New Pensions Scheme." Hon. Members representing English or Welsh constituencies will, I hope, have received an advance copy this morning. By arrangement with my right hon. Friend the Postmaster-General coloured posters will be displayed and copies of the booklet will be available from to-morrow onwards in all post offices in England and Wales. This applies also to all the London and Provincial offices of my Department. In addition, I am bringing the booklet to the special notice of a large number of organisations interested in the new scheme, with a view to their obtaining copies and distributing them to their members. I hope by these and other means to secure the widest possible publicity for the provisions of the Act and in particular for the special advantages it offers to those who apply and are accepted for membership of the scheme during the first year of its operation.

Mr. McEntee: Will copies in numbers be available to Members who may desire them?

Sir K. Wood: Yes, Sir, certainly. I shall be glad to send any number that the hon. Gentleman or other hon. Members require.

Sir Arnold Wilson: Can my right hon. Friend say whether the Federation of Women's Institutes is one of the organisations with which he is in negotiation?

Sir K. Wood: I think so, but I will let my hon. Friend know.

SUMMARY JURISDICTION COURTS (PROBATION).

Mr. David Adams: asked the Home Secretary whether he will consider the advisability of introducing legislation to provide statutory limitation to the powers of courts, when placing offenders on probation, to make conditions which are in their nature unreasonable, unjust, or unduly onerous?

Mr. Lloyd: I would refer the hon. Member to the reply which I gave on 21st July to the hon. Member for the English Universities (Mr. Harvey).

Mr. Adams: Is the hon. Member aware that just recently a certain bench of magistrates, in placing two youths of 18 years of age on probation, stated that they only did so subject to their joining the Territorial Army, and does he not consider that that is an abuse of authority?

Mr. Lloyd: No, Sir, I was not aware of that. As I said in my reply on 21st July, my right hon. Friend will bear in mind the desirability of dealing with this particular matter in some future circular to magistrates.

CINEMA WORKERS' CONDITIONS (INQUIRY).

Mr. Day: asked the Minister of Labour the results of the inquiries his Department had made into the conditions under which operators and attendants at cinemas are employed; and will he consider appointing a departmental committee for the purpose of investigating these conditions with the object of introducing legislation to regulate them.

The Minister of Labour (Mr. Ernest Brown): The necessary preparations for this inquiry are in progress, but some considerable time must elapse before the results of the inquiry are available. As regards the second part of the Question, I would refer the hon. Member to the reply given to a similar Question by him on 8th July.

Mr. Day: Has not the Minister all the particulars he requires in his office and which were supplied to the Department some years back?

Mr. Brown: Oh, no, Sir, otherwise I should not be making elaborate inquiries in order to get the information full and quite accurate.

Oral Answers to Questions — TRADE AND COMMERCE.

RUSSIA.

Mr. H. G. Williams: asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he will give an undertaking not to renew the Anglo-Soviet financial credit agreement without securing a settlement of all outstanding difficulties, including those relating to public and private debts, nor without provision as to arbitration in respect of future difficulties that may arise; and will he also undertake, in connection

with future negotiations, to consult the various commercial and industrial interests affected in the United Kingdom?

The President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Oliver Stanley): As I stated in the House on 22nd June, the question of entering into another guarantee or credit agreement with the Soviet Government is not at present under consideration, nor has any such proposal so far been made by either party to the present agreement. In the event of any negotiations taking place, however, the several matters mentioned by my hon. Friend will, of course, be given the fullest consideration. As regards the second part of the Question, I can assure my hon. Friend that, if any negotiations take place, I shall follow the normal practice of consulting the United Kingdom interests concerned, though as regards any negotiations, His Majesty's Government must reserve to themselves the right to determine whom they will consult in each particular case.

PARIS EXHIBITION (BRITISH PAVILION).

Mr. Lyons: asked the Secretary to the Overseas Trade Department, whether he will enumerate the main exhibits at the British Pavilion of the Paris Exhibition; and by which Department the same were accepted and approved.

Mr. R. S. Hudson (Secretary, Overseas Trade Department): I am sending my hon. Friend a copy of the official catalogue of the exhibits in the United Kingdom Pavilion. As regards the second part of the Question, the responsibility for the selection of exhibits and for their arrangement and display in the Pavilion was, as I have more than once explained, entrusted by His Majesty's Government to the Council for Art and Industry.

Sir P. Hannon: asked the Secretary to the Overseas Trade Department, whether he has considered the copy sent to him of a resolution adopted at a meeting of the council of the Birmingham Jewellers' and Silversmiths' Association on 19th July last, which expresses concern on the adverse impression created abroad by the British pavilion at the Paris Exhibition in comparison with the pavilions of other countries; and whether any effort is being made to make the pavilion more attractive in the Exhibition of British industrial exhibits.

Mr. Hudson: The answer to the first part of the Question is in the affirmative. I understand that a Sub-Committee of the Council for Art and Industry is at present considering what changes, if any, should be made in particular exhibits.

Sir P. Hannon: Will the right hon. Gentleman give consideration to the points raised in the letter in the "Times" this morning on the Paris Exhibition from the hon. Member for Maidstone (Mr. Bossom)?

Mr. Gallacher: Will the hon. Member visit the Soviet Union pavilion and see how a pavilion should be set out?

SHARE-PUSHING (COMMITTEE'S REPORT).

Sir J. Mellor: asked the President of the Board of Trade when he expects to receive the report of the Departmental Committee on Share-Pushing?

Mr. Stanley: I have received the Committee's report, which will be published as soon as possible.

GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS (SUPERANNUATION).

Mr. Guy: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer on what occasion agreement was reached between the Treasury and the Association of Ex-Service Civil Servants on the point that unestablished service should not reckon for pension?

The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Lieut.-Colonel Colville): An agreement was concluded between the Treasury and the Association of Ex-Service Civil Servants on 20th January, 1925, as an agreed final settlement of the claims to permanent employment in the Civil Service of ex-service men temporarily employed, which, as my right hon. Friend pointed out in his reply on 27th July to the hon. Member for Ince (Mr. G. Macdonald), involved acceptance of the conditions of establishment in force at the time.

Mr. Guy: Is it not the case that the agreement of 1932 expressed disagreement on this question, and is there not a new feature in the Superannuation Act, 1935, which provides for counting half temporary service for superannuation in future?

Lieut.-Colonel Colville: I cannot agree with my hon. Friend in the point that he put. I would point out that the decision announced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer was the result of very careful and sympathetic consideration and that this matter has been reviewed by various Governments. A very large number of ex-service civil servants have been established in the last few years.

Mr. Guy: Does not the Act of 1935 introduce a new feature and lay down a new rule?

Lieut.-Colonel Colville: indicated dissent.

TELEPHONE KIOSKS (EMER GENCY CALLS).

Mr. Day: asked the Postmaster-General, whether he is aware that small signs have been erected recently in the public telephone kiosks in the post office situated in Great Cumberland Place, W.I, with the following wording, "Emergency calls, place two pennies in slot and ask exchange for Fire, Police, and Ambulance"; and, in view of the fact that it is impossible to obtain any reply from the exchange until the coins have been placed in the coin box, will he consider having all telephone kiosks and other similar telephone boxes situated in thickly populated areas fitted with an emergency button.

The Assistant Postmaster-General (Sir Walter Womersley): The reply to the first part of the Question is in the affirmative, and to the second part in the negative: but I will endeavour to make the matter somewhat clearer to the Hon. Member. The great majority of call offices are connected to exchanges where it is possible to make an emergency call without the insertion of coins. The provision of an "emergency" button in such cases would be useless. The only call offices at which an "emergency" button can serve any useful purpose are those connected to central battery manual exchanges: and in these cases it is necessary to provide costly apparatus at the exchange for each call office from which emegency calls are to be made without insertion of coins. This is done wherever it would meet a genuine need, that is to say at all telephone kiosks in the accepted sense. It would be a waste of money to make such


arrangements in the case of call offices inside a Post Office or other premises where coins could readily be obtained in emergency. Tins applies to the two call offices mentioned by the Hon. Member, which are not kiosks in the accepted sense.

Mr. Day: Is the hon. Member aware that all the call offices in the immediate vicinity of the one mentioned in the Question have this sign, and that it is impossible to get through to the exchange without inserting coins in the box? Is he aware that the postmasters and post-mistresses have informed me that there is no way in which you can get an emergency call if you have not the coins in your pocket?

Sir W. Womersley: All our outside call boxes have emergency call buttons. The call boxes inside the Post Offices have not these emergency buttons, but if the call is a genuine emergency call, the person making the call can have the twopence back.

Mr. Day: Can the hon. Member tell me how a person wishing to make an emergency call can do so if he has not the pennies in his pocket at the time? Is there any way in which he can make the call? Can he insert silver?

Sir W. Womersley: He can obtain coppers from the counter in the Post Office.

Mr. Gallacher: Does the Minister mean to suggest that anybody can go into a Post Office and ask for twopence for an emergency call?

Sir W. Womersley: I cannot imagine either of the hon. Members not having at least 6d. in his pocket.

Mr. Day: Is the Minister aware that in all the other call boxes in this immediate vicinity, whether in Post Offices or otherwise, these signs are exhibited, and that there is a notice in the Post Offices that people cannot make a call unless coins are placed in the box?

ROYAL AIR FORCE (CONTRACTS, FAIR WAGES CLAUSE).

Mr. McEntee: asked the Under-Secretary of State for Air, in what way Messrs. F. W. Rigby and Company violated the fair-wages clause; whether

there were under payments of wages due to workmen; what were the numbers of workmen so underpaid and the amount of underpayment; and whether it is proposed to remove the name of the firm from the list of contractors to his department?

The Under-Secretary of State for Air (Lieut.-Colonel Muirhead): The determination of the rates of wages payable in the trade has proved a complex question and leaves doubt as to how far there may have been an actual breach of the fair-wages clause. The extent to which there were underpayments of wages, if any, to workmen is still a matter on which further information is required and further correspondence is taking place between the Department and the firm. The answer to the last part of the Question is in the negative.

NAVAL AND MILITARY PENSIONS AND GRANTS.

29. Mr. Tinker: asked the Minister of Pensions whether he can make a statement on the position respecting an inquiry into the conditions of ex-service men who claim to be suffering from war service upon which a deputation of Members of Parliament interviewed him?

The Minister of Pensions (Mr. Ramsbotham): I would refer the hon. Member to the reply which I gave to a similar question on 13th April last. The position remains unchanged as I am still without evidence to justify the suggested inquiry.

Mr. Tinker: If I remember rightly when the deputation met the hon. Member on 3rd February, they were given to understand that some information was expected from the ex-service men and that when he got the reply he would go into the matter and see what could be done. Has he received that information?

Mr. Ramsbotham: I explained that the British Legion were carrying out investigations. As far as I am aware, the investigations are still going on, and I am without any further information.

EDUCATION, LEICESTER (SIZE OF CLASSES).

Mr. Lyons: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Education what


steps are in active progress for the reduction in the size of those school classes in the city of Leicester where there are 40 or more pupils on the roll?

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Education (Mr. Kenneth Lindsay): I must remind the hon. Member that the rule that the number of children in a class should not exceed 40 applies only in the case of senior children: in the case of younger children the maximum is 50. As regards the 48 classes in Leicester with more than 50 on the roll on 31st March last, inquiry has shown that by the end of last month the number had been reduced to 38, and that steps were being taken by which the remainder will be eliminated as soon as possible. The cases of classes of senior children exceeding 40 on the rolls are being investigated.

Mr. Lyons: Can the hon. Member give the House an assurance that it is the aim of the Department to put an end to these large classes in the efficient control of education?

Mr. Lindsay: Yes, we do press on with this matter as fast as possible, but I would remind my hon. and learned Friend that it is not quite so simple. There are cases in Leicester and elsewhere, where on new housing estates there is a shortage of accommodation. However, we intend to press on with the matter.

Mr. Lyons: Where there are new housing estates and there seems to be no accommodation, are steps being taken to provide schools at the earliest possible moment?

Mr. Lindsay: Yes, Sir.

DEFENCE (CONSCRIPTION OF INDUSTRY)

Mr. Mander: asked the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, the position with regard to the preparation of provisional plans for the conscription of industry in war-time, referred to in paragraph 25 of the statement relating to the Report of the Royal Commission on the Private Manufacture of and Trading in Arms, 1935–36.

The Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence (Sir Thomas Inskip): I would refer the hon. Member to the statement I

made in the Debate in this House on 26th May, 1937. The preparation of the necessary plans is under continual consideration and steady progress is being made.

Mr. Mander: Am I not right in thinking that this is one of the recommendations of the Royal Commission which the Government enthusiastically accepted, and can we have a definite statement of progress when the House reassembles?

Sir T. Inskip: I have given a definite statement of the progress that is being made.

FLEET AIR ARM.

Mr. Attlee: (by Private Notice) asked the Prime Minister whether he has any statement to make with regard to the Fleet Air Arm.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Chamberlain): Yes, Sir. The proposals which the Government have had under their consideration refer to two classes of aircraft. The first class includes all aircraft borne in ships of the Royal Navy. These are known as the Fleet Air Arm. They are under the operational control of the Admiralty, but as part of the Royal Air Force they are under the administrative control of the Air Ministry. The second class includes shore-based aircraft employed in co-operation with naval forces. These are under the operational as well as the administrative control of the Air Ministry.
Under one proposal which has been before the Government the Admiralty would in each case have been given both the administrative and the operational control, and the whole of the personnel would be naval. The Government have, however, decided that in the case of the second class, namely shore-based aircraft, which term includes flying boats, there shall be no alteration in the present systems. In the case of the Fleet Air Arm the Government consider that these ship-borne aircraft should be placed under the administrative control of the Admiralty. The necessary steps to give effect to this decision will be taken. The change can only be carried out gradually and with the fullest co-operation between the two Services. The same close cooperation between the Services is indeed vital in the whole strategic field where both ships and aircraft are concerned, and


I am happy to give the assurance that this co-operation will be given without reserve.
I wish to make it plain that the decisions which have been reached do not reflect upon the present condition of the Fleet Air Arm where a keen and efficient service has been built up, but have been reached because the Government believe the lines now laid down will be the most satisfactory arrangement for the future. I also desire to express the Government's appreciation of the untiring efforts of the Air Ministry to make a success of the system for which they have been responsible.
I hope that these decisions which the Government have reached after full inquiry will be accepted in every quarter as a final and satisfactory settlement of a prolonged controversy which it is in the public interest to close.

Mr. Attlee: Was it not possible for the Prime Minister to arrange to make this statement to the House at a time when we could have discussed it? The whole question of the co-ordination of Defence was debated last Monday, and in view of the length of time which these proceedings have taken, is it only just to-day that a decision has been come to?

The Prime Minister: I regret as much as the right hon. Gentleman that it was not possible to come to a decision before. Of course, if we had we should have given the House an opportunity of discussing it. I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that the decision was not delayed in order to deprive the House of that opportunity. It was reached at the earliest possible moment.

Captain Harold Balfour: Does the transfer of the administrative responsibility for seaborne aircraft include the setting up of a dual system of training and a duel system of supply, or will they still remain the primary responsibilities of the Air Ministry?

The Prime Minister: The question of training is one which will have to be worked out by the Admiralty and the Air Ministry in co-operation with one another, and at the present we have not attempted to define the exact lines of agreement. I think it will be found possible to combine control with a certain amount of responsibility on each side without in any way injuring efficiency.

Lieut.-Colonel Moore-Brabazon: May I ask whether the Prime Minister could not arrange for the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence to elaborate this decision to-day before we disperse, so that we may have a clearer idea of the subject?

Commander Sir Archibald Southby: In this transfer will there be any transfer of aerodromes to naval administration to be used by naval machines when they are flying off ships?

The Prime Minister: That is another point which, obviously, must be decided by the two Departments after they have had an opportunity of considering the matter.

Mr. Churchill: Are we right in assuming that in principle the Fleet Air Arm will, if necessary, be permitted to have the necessary shore establishments for the purpose of training their own pilots for the Fleet Air Arm?

The Prime Minister: There must be training of the personnel of the Fleet Air Arm on shore.

Mr. Churchill: Under the Admiralty?

The Prime Minister: Again, that is a matter for the Admiralty and the Air Force to consider what is the best plan. I should imagine, for example, that it might be that the Admiralty would have a portion of an aerodrome which is now under the Air Force, and that in another case they might have an aerodrome entirely on their own. I do not think we can say exactly what the decision will be at this moment.

Mr. Churchill: But in principle that is so, is it not?

The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir.

Mr. Benn: Does not the Prime Minister agree, in view of the vital importance of this subject and the opportunity which presents itself to-day, that the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence should explain more fully exactly what is intended?

Mr. De Chair: Will there be an opportunity of discussing this at the beginning of next Session?

Mr. Churchill: It would be in order to raise it to-day.

Lieut.-Commander Fletcher: Is it not the case that after prolonged delay and prolonged inquiry only a broad decision


has been arrived at, and that none of those details which are likely to give great trouble and difficulty have been settled at all?

The Prime Minister: That is what I have said. The broad principle has been determined, but a great many details have to be settled, and I have every reason to suppose that they will be settled amicably by co-operation between the Admiralty and the Air Force. There is no reason why hon. Members should not raise this question on the Motion for the Adjournment, and if they do I have no doubt that my right hon. Friend the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence will be present.

Mr. Attlee: Is it the view of the Prime Minister that the decision come to by the Government has definitely settled this controversy, and will he use his influence to prevent it being continued as an internecine warfare between the two Departments? If it has not been settled it is no use pretending that it has, and we shall have this constant firing between the Departments over and over again.

The Prime Minister: The Government decision, as taken, and now made public, is final. As far as it can settle the controversy it has settled it. We cannot prevent individuals from still firing shots but we hope they will refrain from doing so, because it is desirable in the public interest that this controversy should be settled.

Mr. Attlee: I am asking the Prime Minister whether he is going to use his authority to prevent this constant firing between the Departments which has been going on for years now to the detriment of the Services. If a decision had been come to, is he going to insist upon it being implemented by the Departments?

The Prime Minister: I do not know why the right hon. Gentleman should suggest that the Departments are not loyally going to carry out this decision. I have had an assurance from both that they intend to do so, and I entirely accept that assurance. What I say is that I cannot prevent individuals over whom I have no authority firing shots if they think fit.

Mr. Attlee: Is the Prime Minister aware that this matter has been settled before

and reopened again and again after settlement?

Sir P. Harris: Is it not the job of the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence to make the scheme work? Is not that what he was appointed for?

Mr. Benn: Does not the Prime Minister think, in view of what he has said about the matter being raised to-day, and in view of the fact that we do not know what has been decided beyond the statement he has made, that it would be better if the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence made a short statement to-day amplifying what he has said?

Mr. Gallacher: In view of the fact that this final settlement is only likely to be of a temporary character, would it not be advisable to call the House together to have a full discussion?

Mr. Montague: May I ask whether the Government in coming to a conclusion upon this issue have taken into account the question of the strategic control of the Air Arm in time of war?

The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir.

Mr. Benn: I beg to give notice that I will raise this matter to-day. I would also further ask the Prime Minister to consider whether the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence can make a short statement so that we shall not be beating the air.

MESSAGE FROM THE LORDS.

That they have agreed to,—

Consolidated Fund (Appropriation) Bill.

Amendments to—

Ministry of Health Provisional Order Confirmation (Morecambe and Heysham) Bill [Lords], without Amendment.

Factories Bill,—That they do not insist on their Amendment to the Factories Bill to which this House has disagreed.

ADJOURNMENT (SUMMER).

Motion made, and Question proposed,
That this House, at its rising this day, do adjourn till Thursday, 21st October; provided that if it is represented to Mr. Speaker by His Majesty's Government that the public interest requires that the House should meet at any earlier time during the Adjournment, and Mr. Speaker is satisfied that the public interest does so require, he may give notice that he is so satisfied, and thereupon the House shall meet at the time stated in such notice and the Government Business to be transacted on the day on which the House shall so meet shall, subject to the publication of notice thereof in the Order Paper to be circulated on the day on which the House shall so meet, be such as the Government may appoint, but subject as aforesaid the House shall transact its business as if it had been duly adjourned to the day on which it shall so meet, and any Government Orders of the Day and Government Notices of Motions that may stand on the Order Book for the 21st day of October or any subsequent day shall be appointed for the day on which the House shall so meet."—[The Prime Minister.]

11.46 a.m.

Mr. Tinker: Before you put the Question, Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask for your guidance. The Motion states that His Majesty's Government, if they think it necessary, may ask you to call the House together at an earlier time during the Adjournment. I wish to ask you what would be the position if a large number of hon. Members, or the Opposition, wanted to call attention to any particular point? What method would they have to adopt? Would they have to approach the Government, through the Prime Minister, to find out whether or not the Government would give consent for the Opposition to approach you? After all, we have been given a certain status as an Opposition, judging by the Act which was passed and which provided for a payment to the Leader of the Opposition. Will you be so good as to inform me how we should stand if we desired to call the House together?

Mr. Speaker: If the hon. Member is asking me that question, the answer is that it is for any hon. Member to approach the Government if he so desires.

Mr. Tinker: It would be for the Prime Minister and the Government to approach you or not, as they thought fit?

Mr. Speaker: That is in the terms of the Motion.

Question put, and agreed to.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Captain Margesson.]

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

11.48 a.m.

Mr. Attlee: I do not intend to trouble the House with a long speech. On the Motion for the Adjournment, hon. Members in all parts of the House wish to raise a number of matters, and I know that several are to be raised to-day. Moreover, we have just heard notice given that another very important question is to be discussed. However, I make no apology for asking the House for a few minutes to consider the position in which we are adjourning at this time. We are leaving for nearly three months' holiday at a time when there is an extremely critical position in foreign affairs. I think that every hon. Member who is going off for his holiday must be full of anxiety, and must be wondering whether it may not be that we shall have to come back before it is generally expected. In the Far East, the flames of war seem to be shooting up. In the West, the Spanish contest shows no signs of coming to an end, and the policy of non-intervention adopted by the Government in order to prevent that conflagration from spreading seems to be only too likely to break down altogether.
It is unfortunate that we have to leave to-day before we have the results of the meeting of the Non-Intervention Committee this morning, but already there are indications that the possibility of agreement on the Government's proposals is very slight. We were criticised for raising this matter on the Adjournment the other day, but I say that our altitude has been justified. At that time, the Government pointed out that the matter was urgent and would brook no delay. What we have had has been simply a continuance of the delays that we have had so often. It is now two months since the withdrawal of Germany and Italy from naval control. When that happened, it was said that the control must be reinstated at the earliest possible moment. Instead, delay continued, and meanwhile it is clear that the insurgents, with foreign aid, are seeking to get a quick decision, while the Spanish Government are still hampered by the operation of one-sided control. The land frontier remains closed to the Spanish Government, but every day the naval forces of


General Franco, supported probably by the naval forces of other Powers, are increasingly impudent in breaches of international law, because those forces have only the status of pirates. On the point of delay and of the fact that these proposals would merely continue what has happened, we are amply justified.
We said that the Government's proposals would not effect their purpose. We said that they were an attempt to bridge the unbridgeable, and that no agreement was worth having unless there was the will to carry it out. From the first meeting which considered those proposals, we found dilatory tactics, and we found that there were fundamental disagreements between various Powers. We do not yet know what the replies are, but one gathers the impression that there is a triple division. Some Powers hold that no belligerent rights should be granted; other Powers hold that the granting belligerent rights and the withdrawal of foreign nationals should be synchronised one way or another according to the Government's proposals; and I gather that other Powers press for belligerent rights before there has been any subtantial withdrawal of foreign nationals. I could not help being amused when I saw a leading newspaper announce with a tremendous "splash" that Italy was in complete agreement with all the Government's proposals, and then, on looking inside the newspaper, found that there were reservations on the two vital points, on which there was disagreement. Moreover, there has been no elucidation up to the present as to what substantial withdrawal means, and no elucidation as to the proportion of withdrawal to take place on either side. It is clear that the hopes of progress on these lines are somewhat remote.
Now, we have to rise for the Recess, and I wish to ask the Government what is their view of the situation, and what is to happen? Are there to be more delays and more evasions, while all the time one-sided non-intervention continues? I want to stress that point, for I do not think any one can doubt that throughout the whole of his period nonintervention has worked very heavily against the Spanish Government. Again and again we have demanded that the Spanish Government should be given its full rights. If there is a complete break-

down, will the Spanish Government be given those rights? I confess to anxiety as to whether the Government, in an attempt to preserve a kind of facade agreement, will not gradually recede even from the proposals which they have put forward. We consider that those proposals are gravely insufficient, but the Government put them forward, based on the principle that there should be no grant of belligerency until there had been a substantial withdrawal of foreign nationals. I am afraid of further retreat and of other proposals made before the Non-Intervention Committee or, perhaps, if non-intervention breaks down altogether, action on the part of this Government by itself in granting either full or partial belligerent rights to General Franco.
I wish to stress again the great danger, from the point of view of international law, of the granting of belligerent rights to insurgents who depend upon a foreign Power. That is the real issue. It is not just an admission that there is a state of civil war. It is an admission and a recognition of aggression. I quote from a well known writer on international law:
Recognition by a foreign state of full belligerent rights, if not justified by necessity, is a gratuitous demonstration of moral support to the rebellion and of censure on the parent Government.
There are Members in this House who, day after day, give what I should call gratuitous demonstrations of moral support of the rebels in Spain, but I hope that this Government is not going to give any such demonstration. I think even a partial grant of belligerent rights is dangerous. It has been suggested that there is nothing much in the granting of belligerent rights after all, but whatever there may be in it from the point of view of the local situation, the granting of belligerent rights has serious consequences. It amounts to a partial recognition of the rebels, and I hold that this would be not only injurious to the fabric of international law, but extremely dangerous to British interests. I believe it would lead to the exposure of our ships to still greater risks of attack and capture, not merely in territorial waters but on the high seas. Rules are laid down in regard to belligerency and the rights of belligerents and the rights of neutrals, but I have never observed that General Franco has shown himself to be a student of international law, and I have never


observed that he has shown the slightest degree of desire to fulfil international law. Nor do I think there has been shown any keen respect for international law on the part of his backers. You may have, perhaps, an alleged effective blockade; you may have allegations of contraband or of unneutral practice by our vessels; you may have our ships attacked not only in territorial waters but on the high seas; you may have a long distance blockade on the ground that the Straits of Gibraltar are controlled by General Franco. You may have blockades not only by General Franco's ships but by the ships of the Powers that back him. I want to ask for a specific undertaking. I want an undertaking that Parliament shall be called together before the Government embark on any new policy.

ROYAL ASSENT.

Message to attend the Lords Commissioners.

The House went; and, having returned—

Mr. SPEAKER reported the Royal Assent to:

1. Finance Act, 1937.
2. Appropriation Act, 1937.
3. Coal (Registration of Ownership) Act, 1937.
4. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937.
5. Summary Procedure (Domestic Proceedings) Act, 1937.
6. Cinematograph Films (Animals) Act, 1937.
7. Rating and Valuation Act, 1937.
8. Export Guarantees Act, 1937.
9. Coal Mines (Employment of Boys) Act, 1937.
10. Nigeria (Remission of Payments) Act, 1937.
11. Isle of Man (Customs) Act, 1937.
12. London Naval Treaty Act, 1937.
13. Milk (Amendment) Act, 1937.
14. Factories Act, 1937.
15. Local Government Superannuation Act, 1937.
16. Local Government Superannuation (Scotland) Act, 1937.
17. Agriculture Act, 1937.
18. Clyde Valley Electrical Power Order Confirmation Act, 1937.

19. Ferguson Bequest Fund Order Confirmation Act, 1937.
20. Royal Samaritan Hospital for Women Glasgow Order Confirmation Act, 1937.
21. Aberdeen Corporation (Water Gas Electricity and Transport) Order Confirmation Act, 1937.
22. Elgin and Lossiemouth Harbour Order Confirmation Act, 1937.
23. Paisley Corporation Order Confirmation Act, 1937.
24. Ministry of Health Provisional Order Confirmation (Bridlington) Act, 1937.
25. Ministry of Health Provisional Order Confirmation (Guildford) Act, 1937.
26. Ministry of Health Provisional Order Confirmation (Rhymney Valley Sewerage District and Western Valleys (Monmouthshire) Sewerage District) Act, 1937.
27. Ministry of Health Provisional Order Confirmation (Selby) Act, 1937.
28. Ministry of Health Provisional Order Confirmation (South East Essex Joint Hospital District) Act, 1937.
29. Ministry of Health Provisional Order Confirmation (Tyne-mouth) Act, 1937.
30. Ministry of Health Provisional Order Confirmation (Birmingham Tame and Rea Main Sewerage District) Act, 1937.
31. Ministry of Health Provisional Order Confirmation (Wisbech Water) Act, 1937.
32. Ministry of Health Provisional Order Confirmation (Yeadon Water) Act, 1937.
33. Ministry of Health Provisional Order Confirmation (Clevedon Water) Act, 1937.
34. Ministry of Health Provisional Order Confirmation (Morecambe and Heysham) Act, 1937.
35. Aberystwyth Rural District Council Act, 1937.
36. Bath Corporation Act, 1937.
37. Poole Corporation Act, 1937.
38. Taunton Corporation Act, 1937.
39. North Cotswold Rural District Council Act, 1937.


40. Shoreham Harbour Act, 1937.
41. Southampton Corporation Act, 1937.
42. Staffordshire Potteries Water Board Act, 1937.
43. Watford Corporation Act, 1937.
44. Bristol Transport Act, 1937.
45. Canvey Island Urban District Council Act, 1937.
46. Dartford Tunnel Act, 1937.
47. Liverpool United Hospital Act, 1937.
48. Saint Paul's and Saint James' Churches (Sheffield) Act, 1937.
49. Cardiff Extension Act, 1937.

ADJOURNMENT (SUMMER).

Question again proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."

12.15 p.m.

Mr. Attlee: I was asking the Government for a specific undertaking that Parliament shall be called together before the Government embark on any new policy which would render imminent the granting of belligerent rights to General Franco. The Government have put forward their proposals to the Non-Intervention Committee in which they make the granting of belligerent rights dependent upon the substantial withdrawal of foreign nationals. The granting of belligerent rights should not be made without a substantial withdrawal of foreign nationals and it is only right that the House should be called together to consider the dangerous situation which would, we believe, be created by this recognition of aggression. I would ask the Government whether the time has not arrived when the whole of this matter should be dealt with authoritatively by the League. It is not realised the extent to which everything in the way of international law, everything in the way of treaties and covenants, has now gone by the board. If the Non-Intervention Agreement breaks down, there is no cloak for open aggression. This civil war, which gets worse and worse every week, has been going on for more than a year, and it is time that the other States of Europe and, indeed, of the world should realise that action must be taken if very great evils are not to result. I am afraid that if this Spanish ulcer continues very much longer it may destroy the peace of the world. The device of non-interven-

tion has definitely broke down, and the matter should go before the League where it can be dealt with more fully and with greater hope of peace.
With regard to the situation in the Far East, one gathers from the papers to-day that the situation is far worse than when it was last reported to us in this House. There has been serious bombing of Tientsin, and it looks like breaking out into war. We have to realise that this trouble began from an incident for which, I believe, the Japanese troops—I do not say the Government—were wholly responsible. Japanese troops on the Peking-Hankow railway were in a place where they had no right to be under the Boxer Treaty. The Chinese Government have all the time gone to the very limits in the endeavour to bring about a solution. They have taken a perfectly correct attitude, and are willing to submit to any means of bringing about peace, but every effort they have made has been met by more aggression. One must frankly recognise that this is a continuation of a process which began six years ago. It is only another attack on the integrity of China.
What action do the Government propose to take? If these things are allowed to continue without anything being done, it means the abrogation of all treaties and of the Covenant itself. I should like to ask whether the Nine-Power Treaty is still held to be valid. It secures the integrity of China, and the United States of America, as well as other League Powers, are parties to it. Treaties, pacts and covenants are useless if in any crisis they are ignored. Here, again, it is time for the League to take notice of what is occurring in the Far East. I belive that the tendency now is for aggressive States to bank on the unreadiness of the rest of the world to take any action whatever. I think that these adventures are often pressed by particular sections, and that in the case of Japanese aggression there are elements in the Government who realise the dangers, but they are pressed on by the military party, the military men on the spot. The fact that these things pass without any effective protest encourages and gives power to the more reckless elements in all those States, and unless there is a greater feeling of respect for international law, and unless there is a feeling that the world will not sit by and see


innocent States suffering from aggression, it will be a continued incitement to these gambling and adventurous elements, and will weaken the position of all those elements, whether in Japan, Italy, Germany or other States, who are against this kind of aggression. I ask, therefore, whether we may have a statement from the Foreign Secretary about non-intervention, the position in China, and with regard to this House being called in the event of any change in policy.

12.20 p.m.

Mr. Boothby: I would like to reply to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition. I could not help being rather interested in that part of his speech where he referred to the moral approval which he alleged the Government were giving to the rebels in Spain—

Mr. Attlee: I actually said that the grant of belligerent rights would be moral approval, and I also referred to the moral approval given by certain Members, whom I do not see here to-day, who sit on that side of the House.

Mr. Boothby: One of the reasons why the right hon. Gentleman was so much opposed to granting belligerent rights to General Franco was because of the moral approval it might seem to give him. This country has frequently given moral approval to rebels in many parts of the world, and whether we approve of it must depend on whether we belong to the Left or the Right. If the rebels were fighting against tyranny, I do not think we should find nearly such whole-hearted opposition to moral approval on the part of the Opposition. There are some hon. Members on this side of the House who take a much too pro-Franco view, but the view one takes depends on how one is made. From the speeches of hon. Members opposite one would think that His Majesty's Government have no plan, and no foreign policy except to drift aimlessly along. I submit that that is not true.
I find it difficult on many occasions to support whole-heartedly, in every one of its aspects, the policy of His Majesty's Government, but there is one side of their policy which I do whole-heartedly support, and that is their foreign policy. I think it is admirable, and I feel that the country thinks so, too. I have been told on very good authority that the one thing

which has won by-election after by-election for the Government has been their foreign policy. To listen to hon. Members opposite one might think that it was the one black spot, or the worst black spot, in the Government's policy; but when you listen to the people who go about the country and face the electors you hear from them, and I believe it to be true, that it is the greatest bull point for the Government. It is up to some of us occasionally to approve of the Government's policy and to say so. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary will contradict me if I misinterpret him, but his policy seems to be a negative policy to start off with, although there is an underlying positive policy also, the negative policy being the one which has necessarily to be put into action in the present state of affairs. The negative policy is to keep this country out of war, and that is what the country wants above all else. The positive policy is to support, as far as is practicable and possible at an admittedly very difficult time, the framework of the League of Nations, and the principles which underlie it, of collective security and the substitution of international law for aggression and force. Those principles have been repeatedly stated in the country and this House by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and particularly in a notable speech which he made some time ago at Leamington. From the principles which were laid down there I do not think the Government have since departed.

Miss Rathbone: Will the hon. Member give us a single instance where the Government have given support even to the framework of the League of Nations?

Mr. Boothby: We have announced over and over again our support of it, in co-operation with France. I would ask my hon. Friend what she would do? Would she go to war on behalf of the League of Nations? We have acted in the closest co-operation, at every stage of one of the most difficult periods in foreign affairs through which we have ever passed, with the country which in the main supports, with us, the League of Nations, and that is France. I do not think there is any practical policy to keep the League framework in existence at present except close co-operation with France.

Miss Rathbone: I will not interrupt for more than one minute and I will not do


it again. The hon. Member has challenged me to say what I would do. I would make it clear to the whole world that any case of unprovoked aggression would be resisted by the whole strength of the League.

Mr. Boothby: If the hon. Lady's policy had been carried into action we should have been at war long ago, and I doubt whether we should have been supported by other States, even supported by France and I know that we should not have been supported by the British people. [Interruption]. An hon. Member says, with a cheerful smile, that they would have supported us, as though he himself wished for war. That is the attitude of hon. Members opposite, and I would respectfully suggest that the reason why they are failing so badly in political life is because they keep on giving the impression that they want to drive us into war. The Government have convinced the electors that they are not going to have us driven into war if they can prevent it. That is the issue which divides us at the present time. No country at the present moment will go to war except in self-defence. I challenge hon. Members opposite to contradict that. Here, again, I submit that the policy of the Government is a perfectly logical one. We have military commitments in the West alone, concerning Belgium, Holland and France, where our self-interest is directly at stake. We have said that we will go to war if those countries are attacked. That is a greater military commitment than this country has ever undertaken before. Hon. Members opposite want us to go beyond that, but I do not think we can afford to do so. The only aspect of our foreign policy at the moment which gives me and my hon. Friends on this side anxiety is that the weapons which the right hon. Gentleman requires to carry through an effective foreign policy, or a constructive policy of any kind, may not be quickly enough placed in his hands; and some of our anxieties on that point were not allayed by the debate we had the other day.

Mr. W. Roberts: Then we are going to have a war?

Mr. Boothby: No, because if hon. Members have any logic left they will agree that the stronger the democratic Powers which support the League of Nations

are, the less likelihood there is of war. I think hon. Members opposite admit that, or have they got to the stage when they recommend that we, France, Russia and all the small nations which support the League should disarm and leave Europe free for Italy and Germany? I suggest that it is absolutely essential, if we are to keep the League in being at all, that the countries supporting it, and particularly the great Powers, should be as strongly armed as possible. I thought that at least was common ground between hon. Members on the opposite side of the House and ourselves. At the same time we should make it clear, as I submit the right hon. Gentleman has made it clear, that we do not disinterest ourselves in Central Europe or in the Far East, or in other parts of the world—that we do not and will not approve of aggression in any way. But what hon. Members opposite seem to wish us to do is to pledge ourselves to go to war immediately in the event of aggression in any part of the world. I do not think we can get the people of this country to approve of such a policy, nor do I think it is a practicable one. Here is the real issue. We are pledged to go to war at once if France, or any part of the British Empire, or Belgium, or Holland, should be attacked; and that is enough for the moment. We cannot do more. While I urge that we should make it absolutely clear that we are not disinterested in Czechoslovakia or any of the Central European Powers, or in the Far East, at the same time we cannot take on further military commitments.

Mr. Mander: The hon. Member says we should make it clear that we are not disinterested in Czechoslovakia. What precisely does that mean? What would he do to help?

Mr. Boothby: I mean that in the event of an unprovoked attack on Czechoslovakia we should at once call into action the machinery of the League. I am perfectly prepared to support a policy of sanctions. My right hon. Friend has over and over again expressed the belief in the principle of regional pacts within the League, and it seems to me that if we are to get any effective or coherent action in foreign affairs there must be successive grades or phases of action, or you will never get anybody to approve any action at all. Where I distrust the views of


hon. Members opposite is that I am not prepared in every case to declare war the next day on an aggressor Power in Central Europe. Hon. Members opposite talk continually as though they were anxious to make us do that. For months past they have been trying to make us take action with regard to Spain which would have inevitably landed us in war. Nobody suggests that because the times are dangerous and even terrible and certainly very disheartening, that you should abandon ultimate objectives. The only issue between us is that the Opposition are always inciting us to adopt what we believe would be a reckless policy in the existing stage of the world, which would very likely involve us in war. That course we are determined not to take. Take the case of Spain. What did the right hon. Gentleman opposite demand? Action. He and his friends are always demanding more and more action; but there comes a point when action inevitably becomes military action, if you are too vehement and adopt a policy leaning towards one side or the other. My right hon. Friend has pursued a policy of compromise in this matter in the most difficult circumstances possible. The Leader of the Opposition did demand action with regard to Spain and he cannot deny it.

Mr. Attlee: I do not know what the hon. Member means by "action." All I asked was that the Foreign Secretary should not take action without coming to this House.

Mr. Boothby: I understood that he told my right hon. Friend to go straight to the League of Nations and raise the issue, and get the League to take some action or other in the matter. My right hon. Friend has spent the last two or three months, while the Opposition have made it as difficult for him as possible, doing his very best by methods of compromise to keep us and many other people out of the Spanish conflict. If, as seems quite possible, his last proposals are not acceptable, and the Non-Intervention Committee breaks down, it may be necessary for us to give belligerent rights to both sides and to allow arms to go freely into Spain on both sides. If my right hon. Friend cannot get an understanding between the Russian point of view at the one extreme and the Italian point at the other, and the Committee breaks down and arms are

allowed to flow into Spain to both sides by the removal of control from the frontiers, that need not necessarily involve a European conflict.
But as long as it is possible to keep the Non-Intervention Committee going, to get the representatives of the different competing and conflicting Powers in Spain round a table to talk, and to get any sort of agreement, and some attempt made to withdraw volunteers so as to prevent further intervention and promote neutrality, it ought to be tried until the last moment. If the efforts of my right hon. Friend, which have been fully justified and very heroic, to achieve some compromise and keep the Non-Intervention Committee going in some form or another, fail, and we have to allow arms into Spain, I do not think it is inevitable that we shall now have a European War.
With regard to the Far East, the Leader of the Opposition himself realises that there is another difficult situation. I do not see that any action, apart from action with the United States of America, will achieve anything. If we act in that area we must do so in the closest co-operation with the United States. It is no good dragging the poor, emaciated League of Nations into action again in this sphere. It tried to tackle it and got a pretty bad knock over Manchuria. If we were to invoke the League of Nations to intervene in the dispute between China and Japan, we might impose such a strain upon it as to bring it to the breaking point. The only chance of successful mediation and intervention in Far Eastern affairs is by Great Britain and the United States working together. We cannot tell whether my right hon. Friend can attain that end. Unfortunately, the United States may invoke the Neutrality Act. Under this Act. an aggressor can marshal all his supplies. and then when the Act comes into force no fresh arms can be supplied to either side. The aggressor is thus favoured. But if we can act in this matter in co-operation with the United States, so much the better. At least, the relations between this country and the United States have never been so good.
I am afraid that strong feelings are apt to be aroused on this subject of foreign policy. We are all entitled to hold our views, and I am sure that we hold them sincerely. A passage in a speech by


Professor Crew, of Edinburgh, delivered about two years ago, has always remained in my memory, because it illustrates so well the problem which confronts the Government and the Foreign Secretary to-day in Europe. He said:
Science has put matches into the hands of a lot of grubby, mischievous little boys"—

Miss Wilkinson: Poor Eden.

Mr. Boothby: —" who with them have set the world alight in a blaze of misery and hate, whereas they ought to have been used to light the candle that stands upon the altar of truth.
I would remind hon. Members that my right hon. Friend has unfortunately to deal with a lot of very grubby and very mischievous little boys of different sorts and kinds. I will not indicate more clearly who they may be, but they are very recalcitrant; and, unfortunately, there are a lot of those grubby and mischievous boys in the world to-day. And there may be occasions when they will have to be dealt with quite sharply. But there is also the chance of leading them into better paths.
My right hon. Friend has not had any very spectacular successes—some great conference that has brought off wonderful paper results—during the period of his administration of the Foreign Office. But he has given this country peace at a time of incomparable difficulty. We cannot know from what dangers we have been saved, or the shoals which have been avoided, and that is one of the great difficulties of the administration of foreign affairs. All I can say is that, for my part, I congratulate him upon having kept this country at peace: and I believe that the vast majority of his fellow-countrymen do the same.

12.41 p.m.

Mr. Lloyd George: I congratulate the Government upon having secured at least one whole-hearted supporter of their policy. I never before knew of one who approved everything that they had done. The hon. Gentleman approves of their having organised a protest by the League of Nations against aggression in Manchuria, he approves of our refusal to co-operate with the United States in dealing with that situation—

Mr. Boothby: No.

Mr. Lloyd George: Yes.

Mr. Boothby: In the first Manchurian adventure?

Mr. Lloyd George: Yes.

Mr. Boothby: I never said that.

Mr. Lloyd George: Then there is one thing of which the hon. Gentleman does not approve in the policy of the Government. Mr. Simpson himself has published the actual dispatch that was sent and the reply of one of the predecessors of the right hon. Gentleman in which he refused to co-operate. I am very glad to hear that there is, at any rate, one thing of which the hon. Gentleman does not approve, but he approves of their withdrawing that protest and not acting upon it. He approves of our denouncing the aggression of Italy in Abyssinia, of our organising 40 or 50 nations to declare sanctions and of our withdrawing from that position. There never was a more thorough supporter. If they go to the right or the left, or if they go right down the centre—or do not go at all—he approves. If they turn their backs, he approves of that. That is the kind of supporter to have, and I congratulate the Government upon him. I felicitate with the right hon. Gentleman.
The hon. Gentleman says that the right hon. Gentleman has kept this country out of war and that this is the way to do it; frankly, I do not think it is. I am not now seeking to make a party point. I am just reminding the House of what anybody of experience would tell them—that the best way of ensuring peace is not for a great country like this to give an impression that whatever happens or does not happen, whatever other countries do or refuse to do, there is no point at which we should make a stand. The moment that is known, there are very astute men in command of these dictatorship Powers in Europe who will make a note of it. I once again repeat what I have said before, that nothing weakens a Foreign Minister more than the constant reiteration of the question: "Would you go to war? Would you fight?"—which means that you would not. It means that the great majority of hon. Members behind the right hon. Gentleman are willing that he should protest; that he should go to the League of Nations and make nice speeches there and pass resolutions of pious opinion upon the subject; but they will not allow him to make a real stand if the others defy him.


The moment it is known that we will never go to Geneva to make a protest against anything except the two or three things which have been mentioned and which involve directly the rights of this country, we are, as a member of the League of Nations, of no use; we are only Great Britain standing alone. I could understand an isolationist saying that. I could understand him saying, "Do not let us interfere unless somehow or other it impinges directly upon our interests." That is the point of view of the United States of America, but it never was ours. The whole basis of the League of Nations is a federation of 40 or 50 countries that will combine the whole of their resources and power to prevent aggression—not merely to prevent a particular aggression that interferes with our selfish interests, but aggression that will interfere with the integrity, the liberty, the independence of other nations, and with international right. International right goes completely. It is a policy of "Am I my brother's keeper?" It is not the policy of a government; it is the policy of Cain. I know of nothing that has been more disastrous to the League of Nations than something for which the right hon. Gentleman is not personally responsible, but for which his predecessor was responsible. He talks about governments, and he says—

Mr. Boothby: Does the right hon. Gentleman acquit the French Government of all blame in the Abyssinian episode? Why does he put all the blame on the British Government?

Mr. Lloyd George: I have never done that, but at present I am in the British Parliament, and not in the French Chamber of Deputies. I have been sent here to represent a constituency, and I have told my constituents exactly what my views are. I am entitled, therefore, to criticise this Government. I am entitled as an individual, as a foreigner, to criticise other countries, but the Government of our own country I am not merely entitled to criticise, but it is my duty to my constituents to criticise the Government if I think they are wrong. I am not going to dwell on the weaknesses of the French, German and other Governments, but I wish to deal with the Government of our own country.
There is no doubt at all that the League of Nations for the time being is dis-

credited. It has lost authority. That is largely because of a policy for which the right hon. Gentleman is not altogether responsible, but for which his predecessors are responsible. Manchuria was, I think, almost a fatal blow. What was left after Manchuria was, I think, completely destroyed by our action on the question of Abyssinia. The right hon. Gentleman, the last time he spoke, said that the League was still alive; that it was neither dead nor moribund. What is it? Perchance it is sleeping. You are not going to refer China to it; that is the answer we had yesterday. You are not going to refer Spain to it. These are the only two wars that are going on at the present moment. Neither of these is to be referred to the League of Nations, and the League of Nations will not be allowed to interfere. Perchance it is sleeping, or it is on a journey, and in that journey it has left Abyssinia in the lurch. Where has it gone? It is obviously not travelling towards Peking, and it is obviously not facing towards Spain. Where is it? It is all very well to say that we are believers in the League of Nations, but, as far as I can see from the drift of the times, from speeches delivered by Ministers and from articles in the Press supporting Ministers, the only function which is in front of the League of Nations when it meets in September is to retreat from our position with regard to Abyssinia, and to acknowledge the aggression which the League denounced two or three years ago. Unless the speech of the Secretary of State for War means that, what does it mean? To-day there is an article in the "Daily Mail" which indicates that possibility. It is incredible that anything of the kind could possibly happen.
I have been drawn from the theme on which I intended to speak by the speech of the hon. Member for East Aberdeen (Mr. Boothby). I rather wanted to ask a few questions, in addition to those which have been put by my right hon. Friend about what is likely to happen during the two or three months that this House is not sitting, if the Non-Intervention Pact breaks down, as I think it must. I do not think it will work; I think it has been a complete failure. We are the only people who stood by our bargain honourably. We signed the Pact, and, in accordance with the honour of this land,


we stood by it. Even if we swear to our own hurt, we abide by it. I congratulate the Government upon doing what every honest Briton would do in these circumstances. But we stand alone. What guarantee is there that, if you sign another Pact, anybody else will abide by it? Let us recognise the realities of the situation. There are four Powers there, and they do not trust each other, whatever they sign. When they enter into a bargain, there is not one of them that believes that the others will keep it, and what they are each afraid of is that, if they keep it, the others will break the bargain and equip one party with troops and material to such an extent that the position will become irretrievable. They hear that one of these Powers has sent troops, has sent guns, has sent aeroplanes. It is very likely that it may be exaggerated; very often it is. It is sometimes possibly a rumour which has arisen out of something which occurred before. It may be a ship without either munitions or troops. But they say, "They have done it before." Thus they send men and materials.
And there is a justification for the distrust. There is a battle being fought at this hour, a terrible battle, or at any rate they are resting before a battle. There are hundreds of thousands of men on both sides armed with every modern weapon of destruction, fierce fighting, scores of thousands of troops, powerful equipment coming from countries whose representatives at the Foreign Office here appended their signatures on behalf of those countries undertaking not to send a single man or a single gun or a single aeroplane. They say, "Let us have another pact." The doctrine of the scrap of paper is paramount in Europe to-day, and the Prime Minister wants to make another arrangement with some of them for a western pact. At the present moment the pact of non-intervention is operating very unequally, very unfairly. I am not charging the Foreign Secretary with having that on his mind. It is owing to conditions over which he certainly has no control.
Owing to the fact that Italy is very much nearer Spain than Russia and that Italy has got the Balearic Islands, which give her a special advantage, there is no doubt at all that both in troops and in material the insurgents have got an

overwhelming advantage, and that is due to the Pact of Non-Intervention. I have been reading a book which I commend to those who would like to know what is really happening and has happened in Spain. It is written by the most distinguished of all the modern Spanish writers, Senor Ramón Sender. It has been translated by a very learned Oxford Professor, Sir Peter Chalmers Mitchell. It is beautifully written. The author gives an account of what happened there. If the right hon. Gentleman would peruse it I think he would find it a very substantial contribution. Now that he may have a holiday he may find it worth while to look at it. The author gives an account of the first few days of the fighting when there were no rifles, no artillery, no anti-aircraft guns, and those on the Government side had to fight Italian tanks.
Even the great defence of Madrid by the international brigade was done entirely by rifle fire. They had no artillery and no anti-aircraft guns. It is a perfect marvel to me why Franco never got into Madrid. Just see what has happened. This shows how unfairly it operates. Franco has these advantages now. Italy and Germany want to utilise and exploit them to the full. He has got command of the sea. That is why they are fighting for recognition of belligerent rights. The "Times" admits that to-day. It says that it would be an advantage. But the Government had two advantages at the beginning. One was that they had cash, they had gold, they had enough money to buy equipment. Franco had the trained men, the trained officers and he had most of the equipment for the Army. Those were his advantages. The advantages which the Government had were these. They had no trained men, they had practically no trained officers they could depend upon, and they had no equipment, but they had cash which would have enabled them to buy and they had for the time command of the sea.
At that moment non-intervention came in and they could not buy. I am thinking of the British Parliament which represents a tradition of fair and open dealing between people when we pretend to hold the balance evenly. It has acted unfairly. There is an overwhelming superiority now in material on the Franco side. They have dealt unfairly and that is why they would prefer that the things should come


to an end. This is what I want to put to the right hon. Gentleman. Is it worth while spinning out this tragic farce which is worrying the public? Is it worth while spinning it out? Hadn't you better bring it to an end? I do not see how these people can agree. I will just point out one or two considerations which I think the right hon. Gentleman must have in his mind. It all depends on the withdrawal of volunteers. Does he really think he can possibly work that out?
In the first place there will be no agreement about figures. You will be told that there are 100,000 or 120,000 Italians and Germans on Franco's side and that there are only about 12,000 volunteers on the Government side. Does the right hon. Gentleman really think he can get agreement between Italy, Germany, France, Russia and ourselves as to the figures? If not how is he going to work it? Is he going to work it proportionately? Is he going to say that for every thousand returned to their respective countries by Franco, the Spanish Government will also send away a thousand? What is the good of that? If it happens that Franco is right and the figures he gives are approximately right, supposing he sends back 20,000 and 20,000 are sent back from the other side, there will still be large numbers left of the volunteers of Italy and Germany. [AN HON. MEMBER: "Volunteers!"] I do not want to beg the question—of foreign troops on both sides, that is what I mean. Then comes the second question. Suppose you seek an agreement about that. You will not get it, for they will never accept each other's figures. It would take too long if you were to send independent men there to examine the camps and find out how many there were who were non-Spanish. You would never arrive at the figure and the figure would, therefore, never be agreed to.
You would then come to the next question, and that is material and far more important. From everything that I can gather, both Franco and the Government at present have a sufficient number of Spanish toops fairly well trained, with considerable experience of war. They have plenty of Spanish infantry, and there was a time when the Spanish infantry were the finest in Europe. There is no doubt that they are first-rate material. Their whole history from the days of

Hannibal will demonstrate that they are magnificent fighting men. Franco says, "I have 500,000." The others say, "We have 500,000"—probably that is approximately correct—trained, experienced men. But one side has a great superiority in technical details, and in modern warfare that is decisive. If you get most of the guns and aeroplanes on one side, even if you have perfect equality as far as trained infantry are concerned, there remains an advantage undoubtedly, and non-intervention, even if it succeeds, means stabilising that superiority. There is no proposal that any guns or aeroplanes should be restored. There is only a proviso that no more shall come in. At the present moment the advantage is on one side. You will stabilise that advantage. That is not fair.
I agree with the hon. Member. It is a Spanish quarrel. Let them fight it out amongst themselves, but do not let us have an interference which operates unequally and unfairly between the parties. The experience that we have had for nearly 12 months shows that it operates now overwhelmingly on the side of the insurgents against the Government. Therefore, why not bring it to an end? The right hon. Gentleman's proposal is that there shall be recognition of Franco, or rather a concession of belligerent rights to him when reasonable progress has been made. What does that mean? What is the definition? How long will it take? You may depend upon it that, if the process begins, there will he quarrels and disputes at every stage as to whether it has been carried out fairly and equitably between the parties, and there will be another breakdown. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will make up his mind and leave them alone, declare neutrality, and give both parties the same right of purchase. That does not necessarily mean belligerent rights if you simply said "Buy your stuff wherever you can get it." Belligerent rights mean another thing, which affects us. The first only affects the contestants. The second affects us.
Belligerent rights would give Franco authority to stop and search our ships, to capture our ships, arid, if they refuse to stop, to sink them. Are we really prepared to do that? I think we ought to know. Someone said to me the other day that belligerent rights were conceded to the Confederacy in the American civil


war, but they were conceded purely as a concession not to the Confederates but to the Government. The Government could not declare a blockade unless belligerent rights were given to the Confederacy, because you cannot declare a blockade against your own ports and against your own citizens, and therefore the Government, in order to establish a legal blockade of the southern ports, had to get us and France to concede belligerent rights, and then the blockade became legalised. That is a totally different situation. We were then helping the recognised Government of the day. An argument that I have heard very often is that the majority of the votes in Spain were against the Government. That has happened in this country many a time, and the Government were elected. That was particularly the case in the election of Lincoln. He was a minority President. There were three candidates and he had a minority vote, but he was elected. He was the recognised head of the State. That is the only way in which you can choose a President. He was the President although he was a President representing a minority of votes. But we recognised it as a Government and treated it accordingly, and we ought to have done the same in Spain.
I would urge further the point made by the Leader of the Opposition. The recognition of belligerent rights is a matter of such importance to us, to our trade, to our shipping, to the possibility of what may happen to our sailors, that it ought not to be conceded without summoning Parliament in order to obtain its sanction. I am glad to see the Prime Minister present, because the Foreign Secretary, naturally, could not answer that question, I hope we shall get an assurance from the Prime Minister that, if there are circumstances that drive him to the conclusion that belligerent rights ought to be conceded, Parliament should be summoned in order that the matter may be submitted to us for the judgment of Parliament as a whole, because it affects the shipping of this country. It is not merely giving an advantage to Franco. It is putting our trade at a disadvantage. You can sink upon the high seas if you suspect that a ship is carrying any contraband to a Spanish port. That is a very serious power to give to an insurgent.

Vice-Admiral Taylor: May I interrupt?

Mr. Lloyd George: This is such an important point. If there was any interruption by anyone on the Front Bench I should be willing to give way, and no one is more ready to give way than I am, as a rule, but on this occasion I must insist. [Interruption.] If there is any answer of that kind it can be given by the Government. At any rate, if the ship proceeds notwithstanding the fact that you fire across the bows—

Vice-Admiral Taylor: That is another thing.

Mr. Lloyd George: Is that the only point? Then I am thoroughly justified in not giving way. Of course, they first of all give a warning. They do not sink a ship on suspicion. The first thing they do is to try to stop it, but, if the ship proceeds notwithstanding that, she may be sunk. I do not think we ought to give power to an insurgent chief to sink our ships, which may be passing along the coast of Spain, maybe not bound for Spain, but for some other port, or along the Bay of Biscay, or in the Mediterranean, the most important and the busiest sea traffic that you possibly can get for your shipping. I hope that we shall get a definite assurance from the Prime Minister, at any rate that, whatever happens, nothing of that kind will occur. I hope that an assurance will also be given that there should be no recognition of the Italian conquest of Abyssinia without the matter first of all being submitted to the judgment of the House.
The Government should give us some definite assurance that they are not going to leave the Gibraltar position where it is at the present moment. I think that it is a very serious thing. Conceive of a Labour Government in power, with a civil war in Spain, say, at a date when we were not on as good terms with Russia as we are even now, if the Russians had fortified the Straits of Gibraltar on both sides, and had guns planted there which would have enabled them to block the Mediterranean against our traffic, what would have been said by hon. Gentlemen opposite? Would they have stood it for one moment? I have read all the answers which have been given. I know something about guns and their power, and I am amazed that the House of Commons should accept those answers. The right hon. Gentleman the Minister for Defence—that is not the right


term, but it is the same thing—does not make any difficulty about it. He treated it with great equanimity. It is extraordinary. I am one of those who did not take part in criticising, although I never knew why he was put there, except that I remember the explanation that was given of the reason why Lord Cranworth was made Lord Chancellor, when there was a very much abler and more brilliant lawyer available at the time. The question was put, "Why was Cranworth made Lord Chancellor instead of Bethell?", and the answer was, "There is only one answer, that it is so much better to be good than to be clever." [Interruption.] Anyhow, it was said, and it is quite true to say that somebody, even an that side, certainly knew far more about defence than the right hon. Gentleman, because he knew nothing about it.
I hope that that is not the kind of answer that is going to be given. It is a very formidable position. An hon. Gentleman complained that I criticised France. I am amazed, if I may be permitted to say it in this Assembly, that France should have stood what happened. I cannot apprehend it. Do you mean to tell me that if Clemenceau had been there he would have allowed the sea power which is in alliance with a confederacy of Fascist Germany and hostile Italy to lay hold of islands and fortify those islands, cut off the communications between France and her North African Colonies, with all that Empire, and close up the Straits of Gibraltar? It is inconceivable to me why France should not have acted. She seems to be waking up at the present moment, but we are not. I cannot say that I am not a believer in an immediate war, and I should be still less a believer in it if I could see a Government that was prepared to make a stand at any point against these military dictatorships. At any rate, there is this fact, which those who have been in office must realise thoroughly, and in fact it is the very basis of their policy of rearmament, that if Powers in Europe know that they are in a powerful strategic position, powerful enough to defeat you owing to strategic opportunities which they have got, when the conflict may arise, they will make use of that power to the very last ounce when they come to negotiate.
I cannot understand it. It is not a question of whether you are for Franco or whether you are against him. Some of us are naturally inclined towards the Right, and some are more inclined towards the Left. But it is more than that. I urge the Government, because it is they and they alone who will have the supreme charge of the interests of this country not to-day, but a very doubtful to-morrow, for which others are preparing. I beg of them not to accept the statements of the Minister of Defence as if they were the last words on the blocking of the Straits of Gibraltar, but to act.

1.23 p.m.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Eden): I am somewhat reluctant to intervene at any length in this Debate, because there are a number of other subjects which hon. Members wish to raise, and because I am conscious that during the past few months I have taken up perhaps more than my fair share of the time of this House. The right hon. Gentleman has made certain statements and has put certain questions, as the Opposition has done earlier in this Debate, with which I feel it my duty to deal at once. The right hon. Gentleman said that it is a very dangerous thing to create an impression in the world that, whatever happens, the Government of this country will take no action. I agree with him entirely that that would be a very dangerous impression to create, but I would say to him that we have never said anything of the kind. On the contrary, we have said exactly the opposite. Even in the last few days, and in the last few weeks, I must remind the House, we have said, in perfectly definite terms, the importance which we attach to the Mediterranean as the main arterial road to British Colonies. I do not want to refer again to the speech which the right hon. Gentleman quoted, which I made in the country some little time ago, and in which, with the full approval of the Government, I set out what action would be taken. I really cannot say that in the light of that, people are going about the world thinking that there is no limit to the action they can take, and that in no circumstances would this country take any step to check that action. I claim on the contrary, that in conditions where, as the right hon. Gentleman rightly said, the League was in conditions of admitted


difficulty, we have contributed what we could to the restoration of international stability by stating quite clearly the action that we would take and the circumstances in which we would take it.

Mr. Lloyd George: Take the question of the fortifications of the Straits in such a way as to create a menace. It is an absolutely new development. It has never been done before. I mean the fortifications at Algeciras. Does that mean that the Government will take action in regard to that, or that they are going to be content simply with a remonstrance?

Mr. Eden: The situation was explained as it was the other day. The right hon. Gentleman must remember that the picture that he has painted is not an accurate one. He must know, for instance, that Ceuta has been heavily fortified for a long time. As regards the actual local situation, my right hon. Friend gave a full account. I am not giving a pledge myself to the House as to what steps we might or might not take, but I can tell the right hon. Gentleman that we are as much alive to this question as he can be, and we are just as conscious of what our rights and privileges in these matters may be. I say quite frankly that the maintenance of those essential rights of ours is not helped by creating an atmosphere as to the existence of conditions when those conditions do not exist.
Let me say, in regard to what the right hon. Gentleman has said about the Mediterranean, what our position is there. I have stated what we consider to be the privileges that we are entitled to enjoy there and which we refuse to none other, and that in the Mediterranean there shall be a right of way for all. We intend to maintain our right of way and we willingly admit that others have an equal right. That position has been made abundantly clear and that position this country will maintain, and I have no doubt the French Government will maintain it also.
With regard to the situation in Spain, the right hon. Gentleman spoke a great deal about the question of belligerent rights and about our scheme. With regard to our scheme, I have already explained that it stands or falls as a whole. We will not agree to any major modifications which would upset its balance. Therefore, if that scheme is accepted the anxieties of the right hon. Gentleman, the Leader of the Opposition, can be allayed,

because it will mean that belligerent rights will not be granted except under the conditions laid down in the scheme. Before I contemplate failure I should like for a moment to deal with one or two comments which the right hon. Gentleman made in connection with non-intervention. I must repeat that it is the Government's intention to go on with non-intervention so long as the nations of Europe as a whole are prepared and wish to do so. I know that hon. Gentlemen opposite approach this question from the point of view that General Franco's supporters are only a few mutinous officers and that therefore the whole result of the civil war must be due to the fact that intervention has been much more on one side than the other. But in reality there have been fluctuations.
In the early stages General Franco obtained from abroad a great deal of material which was of inestimable assistance to him. On the other hand, it must be remembered that Madrid was saved by the International Brigade, a truly remarkable military feat. But do not disguise the fact that it was a feat by people who were not Spaniards. If you take the figures of the last general election you will find that the country was more or less evenly divided between the Government and the Opposition. If there is a lesson to be learnt in Spain this year it is surely this, that the intervention which there has been on both sides has not been decisive and, despite intervention, the balance in Spain has remained very much as it was at the last general election.
Hon. Members opposite look upon the policy of non-intervention as if it was some exclusively British policy, as if I was responsible for all sorts of strange devices to keep it in being and to force a reluctant Europe to accept it, and to prevent the League which is longing for the job from doing it. I see no signs of that desire. If they want to do it, then so far as the Government of this country is concerned they are welcome to it. If there is any other capital, be it Moscow, Berlin or Rome, which would like to be the centre of the Non-Intervention Committee, they are very welcome to it. The truth is that other people want to go on with this policy. In the last few days the French Government have made it clear that they want to go on with this policy. The whole tenor of their answer shows that. Of course, they want im-


provement. They want control, and they want volunteers withdrawn, as does the right hon. Gentleman. So do we. But they do not want to give up the policy if they can possibly help it.
I do not want to detain the House, but a very remarkable speech was made by M. Blum, the Leader of the Socialist Party in France, at the Socialist Conference in Marseilles, and I only wish the right hon. Gentleman had been present to hear it. He said:
I will take on my shoulders entire responsibility.
That is, for the policy which is being pursued:
Our policy, it is widely said, has been shown up by what has happened. Admittedly many forecasts and many hopes have been belied by events. But for a year we have avoided war. Europe has passed through a formidable crisis without an armed conflict. I mean without a general war. It is said: 'War would not have broken out in any case'.
After reviewing the international situation in August and September, M. Blum went on to say:
Without the so-called lie of non-intervention what would the 'Deutschland' and 'Leipzig' incidents have led to? Call nonintervention a lie, a fiction if you like, but the fact remains that it has helped to stop a general war. I am told I have only increased the dangers of war in the future. But the fact is that time has not been working against us, and if to-day there are grave dangers, we are in a different position from that of last year, and that thanks to this so-called fiction. France is now united, agreement with Great Britain is complete, the international situation has changed, international opinion has changed.
Finally, he said:
As regards the increased danger of war in the future, I will not accept this line of argument; the party will never accept it It is the sort of argument used to justify a preventive war.
That is absolutely true.
Before I answer the questions about the future, may I deal with the alternatives, because I do think there is still much confused thinking about the alternatives which face us if this policy breaks down. The right hon. Gentleman talked, and I admit the force of what he had to say on the subject of neutrality. He said that we should deal with the situation by a policy of neutrality. In the last debate he said in effect: "Let us deal with these things as they have been dealt with

before. Neutrality is the right policy." Where I part company with him is that a declaration of neutrality necessarily involves the existence of belligerent rights. There is no such thing as a policy of neutrality which is not accompanied by the treating of both sides equally. That was true of the Balkan wars and others, where we declared a policy of neutrality. There are many people who know a great deal about international law who say that from the beginning we ought to have declared neutrality. That would have allowed us to sell arms, but it would also have involved the granting of belligerent rights. It may be that that is a wise policy to pursue. What is not a possible policy, and what is a non-existent policy, is to say that you are neutral and not grant the belligerent rights which form part of your policy of neutrality.
The right hon. Gentleman's position is that the scheme is not working, that it is a farce and that it is far better to make a clean cut and declare neutrality. I say that that involves belligerent rights, and every student of international law bears me out. It is a possible policy; and we have never denied it. But I would like to point out what that policy would not achieve, besides resulting in a more dangerous situation for Europe because the flow of arms and men would be quite uncontrolled. The policy of the right hon. Gentleman would not achieve the withdrawal of a single foreigner from Spain. All those who are there would remain. But that is not all. The right hon. Gentleman said that these Powers are not keeping non-intervention; that they come to the Foreign Office, sign a paper, and then go away and pay no attention to their word. If these Powers are not to be trusted to observe non-intervention, on which there are some checks, why is it supposed that they are going to observe a mere declaration of neutrality when you remove all the checks? If you are going to make a declaration of neutrality, grant belligerent rights and remove all these checks, how are you going to stop breaches of what we call non-intervention, that is foreign aid being given in large quantities in materials, and, what is more important, in men? I do not often quote the Soviets in my support, but there was a paragraph in the "Isvestia" which struck me as being rather a remarkable confession coming from that quarter.


Whatever the naval control was, with all its screaming failures and faults, it did create some difficulties for the interventionists. It was a definite obstacle preventing them from supplying their own and Franco's troops with arms.
That is what the Soviet Government think. If that goes and we are left with a declaration of neutrality I fail to see how that will be observed any better than the present system is observed.
There is another course, and I hope I am not misrepresenting the Party opposite. There is a difference between them and the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs. There are three courses possible—the one we have followed, the one the right hon. Gentleman has described, and the third course which has been advocated in the past by bon. Gentlemen opposite and which I think is still their position. It is that we should withdraw from non-intervention and sell arms only to the legitimate Government of Spain, as they describe it. Observe what that means. It would not be accompanied by the grant of belligerent rights. It means this, that our ships taking arms to Spain, only to one side in Spain, are protected right up to Spanish territorial waters. Whatever else that may be it is not neutrality. And it is not non-intervention. Hon. Members opposite are quite frank about it. They want to help the Government to win, to make sure, as the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Mr. Dalton) said, that Franco does not win. That may be a reasonable desire, but I do not think their policy would effect the object which hon. Members have in mind. If arms could be sent by sea from here they could easily be out-weighted by arms sent by other countries to the other side. If hon. Members opposite want what the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland said, to make sure that Franco does not win, there is only one way of doing that, and that is by the active participation by this country in Spain with all the consequences which would follow. You have to face that chain of events. That is not a policy which either the Government or the country have any intention for one moment of following.
Let me answer the questions which have been put to me. So far as our scheme stands we shall not accept any major modification of it. If the scheme fails, what then? I confess that I find it very hard to see how non-intervention can be

saved. I think we should reach a situation which the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs desires. We should regret a collapse of non-intervention. If that happens it would create an entirely new situation, one in which the frontiers would be open and all check on the supply of men and materials withdrawn. Would it be so serious a situation as to necessitate the immediate summoning of Parliament? That is a question which I cannot answer now any more than I can tell hon. Members what our policy would be at that time in circumstances which no one at present can visualise. It must clearly depend on the circumstances of the breakdown, and without a breakdown our plan stands. If there is a breakdown our action must depend on the circumstances, on the international situation, and on a number of other considerations which the House cannot know and which the Government do not know at the present time.
We have sought through a very difficult year to give the House all the information we could, speaking in the Debates whenever called upon to do so, and the House can be assured that the last thing we want to do is to withhold from it full information or full power of co-operation and criticism of our policy. We must not underrate the desire of European nations not to let non-intervention break down. The circumstances may not arise, but if they do then if it is the Government's view that the situation is so serious that Parliament must be summoned, the Government would ask Mr. Speaker to do so. Beyond that I cannot go in circumstances which must at present be purely hypothetical. It may be that the Spanish situation will undergo some change. I think it is more likely that it will not. The Government themselves contemplate no revolutionary change in their policy and will continue to work for the main objectives for which they have worked all along, that is the localising of this Spanish conflict and the maintenance of the peace of Europe.

Mr. Lloyd George: The question put by the Leader of the Opposition and myself was whether before belligerent rights are granted to the insurgents Parliament will be summoned. If the Government make up their mind to give belligerent rights will they summon Parliament and place the matter before them in order


to obtain the sanction of Parliament for that proceeding?

Mr. Eden: It is impossible for the Government to give that pledge at the present time, but there is a pledge that I can give, that as far the present plan which is before the Committee is concerned, we do not propose to agree to any major modification of it. What will happen if the plan collapses does not only depend upon us, for we should have to consult with other Governments, and certainly with the French Government, on the policy to be pursued. It would be impossible for me to give a pledge now, and I do not think the House can really ask me to do so upon an entirely hypothetical situation. If my right hon. Friend thinks the situation is serious enough, he will ask Mr. Speaker to call Parliament together, but that is something of which the Government must be the judge, and nobody to-day can know what the circumstances will be.

Mr. Attlee: I am not asking the right hon. Gentleman to give a long description of what the Government would do in certain hypothetical conditions. I am asking only one question, and it is on the specific point of the granting of belligerent rights to General Franco without any of the conditions as laid down. It is obvious that the right hon. Gentleman will not get the conditions accepted if people think they can get belligerent rights without accepting those conditions. Therefore, it is obvious that if it were a question of giving belligerent rights apart from the conditions laid down, the House should be called together.

Mr. Eden: I do not think I can go beyond what I have said. I have made it absolutely clear that while this policy continues, that while our plan is before the Committee, we will not agree to any major modifications of it. I do not want to go into the future, and if the House asks for a further pledge in the present position, I do not think it would help us in our diplomacy.
Now, may I say a word about the Far East? I agree with the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition with regard to the seriousness of the situation there. I am afraid that since we met yesterday, it has deteriorated. The Government deeply deplore these events.
We regret them the more because, as the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Caithness and Sutherland (Sir A. Sinclair) said, quite rightly, in a Debate the other day, it seemed as though, at that time, the prospects for international co-operation in the Far East were better than they had ever been. All that appears to have gone for the time being. We continue to be convinced that, in the interests of all nations in the Far East, peace should be preserved, for each one of them would get far more benefit from a policy which tries to eliminate enmity and to co-operate in peaceful development, than any one of them would get from resort to force. As to what action we shall take, I have told the House that we maintain the closest contact with the United States Government and with the French Government. That will continue to be our policy. The hon. Member for Bishop Auckland, speaking in the Debate the other day, gave us some advice. He said:
We should go in step with the United States, not rushing ahead of anything they are prepared to do, but being prepared to go as far and as fast as they."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 19th July, 1937; col 1812; Vol. 326.]
I have no quarrel with that definition. In that sphere, as in others, our objective will be to do everything that lies in the power of a single Government to promote peace and concord between the nations.

1.48 p.m.

Mr. R. Acland: I would like to make a few remarks in reply to the speech made by the hon. Member for East Aberdeen (Mr. Boothby). It seems remarkable that we should have heard that speech from him when, unless he was very different from all the other members of his party and his leaders, he fought the General Election on a pledge to pursue a policy of steady and collective resistance to all acts of aggression. It seems to be remarkable that, having made that pledge, he should now almost glory in the abandonment of that policy by His Majesty's Government.

Mr. Boothby: I used the word "collective." We have not been able to get collective action.

Mr. Acland: The hon. Member seemed to glory in the reversal of that policy by an act of the Government, which threw it away without attempting to get it. The hon. Member fought the election on a promise to get it, although at that time,


if he is right now, he ought to have known that the Government could not get it. Did he fight an election by giving a pledge that he would get something which he knew he could not get?

Mr. Boothby: As the hon. Member is attacking me, perhaps I may be allowed to interrupt again. I could not possibly foretell the course of events in Abyssinia. For that course of events, I do not hold His Majesty's Government primarily responsible, but the French Government, which had not taken such action when the election was fought.

Mr. Acland: In that case the hon. Member was one of the dupes of his own leaders. When they fought the election, every fact was known. There was nothing known to the Government in December, 1935, which was not, or should not have been equally known in November, 1935. The attitude of the French Government was known, the amount of support we might get was known: and the attitude of Mussolini was known. The leaders and Members of the Conservative party gave their pledges to the electors, won their seats accordingly, and now almost glory in the fact that their policy has been abandoned. Fortunately for the traditions of continuity of foreign policy, which are supposed to run through British life while Governments come and Governments go, the Opposition, perhaps in a rather touching way, stands to-day precisely where we stood at the time of the General Election. We still believe that the only hope for world peace is that we should create a group of nations, of which this country would be one, perhaps the foremost, which would be open to all, which would be pledged to defend international justice wherever it might be menaced, and which would possess such an overwhelming preponderance of force that no nation would dare to come against it.
Diametrically opposed to that policy, the Government give promises to defend British Imperial and economic interests, and nothing else. I am amazed that the Leamington declaration of the Foreign Secretary has so frequently been quoted—I think, for instance, it was quoted by the hon. Member for Norwich (Mr. H. G. Strauss) in the Debate on the situation at Bilbao—as being something which is in accordance with League policy. It is nothing of the kind. It is an assertion

that we will fight for our own interests, for France, Belgium and Egypt, not because we like the colour of their eyes, but because the Suez Canal and the Channel Ports are part of our economic interests. It is a declaration that, as regards all the rest, we will not let it be known whether we will do anything or whether we will do nothing. That is the Leamington declaration, diametrically opposed to the Covenant of the League.

Mr. H. Strauss: I am sure the hon. Member does not wish to misrepresent what my right hon. Friend said in his speech at Leamington. If the hon. Member will turn to what my right hon. Friend said in the passage dealing with the Covenant of the League of Nations, he will find that my right hon. Friend was setting out the conditions in which the armed forces of this country would be used. He said that our armed forces would never be used contrary to the Covenant of the League. Whether they would be used or not would be decided at the time, and he made that reservation on account of the terms of the Covenant itself.

Mr. Acland: The declaration was in these terms:
In addition, our armaments may be used in bringing help to the victim of aggression in any cases where, in our judgment, it would be proper under the provisions of the Covenant so to do. I use the word 'may' deliberately, because in such cases there is no automatic obligation to take military action.
May I now quote from Annex F of the Locarno Treaty?
Each State Member of the League is bound to co-operate loyally and effectively in support of the Covenant and in resistance to any act of aggression to the extent which is compatible with its military situation and takes its geographical position into account.
It will be seen that both those declarations involve the possibility of the use of force with certain limitations. The limitation laid down in Annex F of the Locarno Treaty is:
to the extent which is compatible with its military situation.
But the limitation which is laid down in the Leamington declaration is the exact contrary, namely:
If in our judgment it is proper so to do.
We on this side would defend international justice in the belief that by so doing we can keep out of war. The policy of the party opposite is to defend British


economic interests. Defending British economic interests is an admirable policy for keeping out of war, as long as the British Empire is stronger, strategically, than any group of nations that can come against it. Defending British economic interests, however, does not keep us out of war, but on the contrary plunges us into war, as soon as the inevitable happens—and if we go on as we are going now it may happen in a few years—and the British Empire becomes strategically weaker than some group of powers which may come against it. That is happening before our eyes.
In regard to the guns at Gibraltar we were told that a full answer had been given to the questions which we asked from this side. We asked: Are there guns which dominate the harbour and are there guns which dominate the Straits. Under pressure from all sides the Government spokesman would go no further than to say: "There are no guns which dominate the harbour." We take it, therefore, that there are guns which dominate the Straits. We had the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) coming along here at this time of day to talk about Gibraltar. If the records are looked up it will be found that Members on this side of the House began to talk about Gibraltar as long ago as July of last year.
What astounds us is that a Government which pretends that its policy is one of defending British economic interests only, should try to carry out that policy in such an extraordinarily unintelligent and shortsighted way. We would not complain if the Government would pursue their own policy intelligently, but surely one of the supreme British interests has always been not to allow any nation or group of nations to secure a hegemony on the Continent of Europe. Leaving aside idealogies, which group of nations is trying to secure hegemony in Europe at the present time and is coming near to achieving it? It is the Fascist group, the Rome-Berlin axis, Italy and Germany. When a rebellion broke out in Spain the success of which was, manifestly, going to strengthen the Rome-Berlin axis—all this talk about the people resenting interference was simply part of the by-election lullaby which the Government sang throughout the country. I am not surprised that the short-term view of keeping

the country out of trouble goes down well in the by-elections. Against that, the Government are hesitatingly and rather shortsightedly pursuing a policy which is diametrically opposed to the policy which they were elected to pursue.
May I now raise a particular point and ask what is going on both inside and immediately outside territorial waters on the north coast of Spain? I wish to repeat a question which I asked last week and which I thought was capable of a fairly easy answer, namely, whether instructions had been sent to British warships covering the case of a British merchant ship inside territorial waters which refuses to pay attention to a warning shot fired across its bows by an insurgent warship outside territorial waters, and is thereupon fired at by the insurgent warship. We got no answer to that question last week. I hope we shall get one now. I wish to make it clear that the answer to that question cannot. depend on legal rights. It cannot be a legal answer because there are only two or three possibilities. You can have two recognised governments fighting each other. You can have rebels versus government where belligerent rights have been granted, and admittedly the rebels in this instance are establishing many of the conditions under which belligerent rights might be granted, but with one exception they are establishing those conditions as a result of the material assistance from outside sources. That fact alone should be sufficient to deny them the grant of belligerent rights. It is their own fault that they have put themselves in a position in which belligerent rights cannot be granted to them, but, having done so, they must take the legal consequences when they fall into the only remaining category, namely, that of pirates. I am very ignorant on these matters, but I do not know any other category in which they can be placed.
There is a precedent on this question. When the Federalists at Cartagena in 1873 revolted against the Spanish Government at Madrid, seized the fleet, and hoisted the red flag, two ships within territorial waters bombarded the mainland and endangered British interests. A rebel ship was then captured inside territorial waters by British and German gunboats acting together, and this is the answer which the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at that time gave to questions on that subject:


Her Majesty's Government informed the Admiralty that with respect to the Spanish ships of war denounced as pirates by a decree of the Government of Madrid, Her Majesty's Government consider that if such vessels commit any acts of piracy affecting British subjects or British interests they should be treated as pirates the decree of the Spanish Government having deprived them of the protection of their flag.
That is the legal position, and therefore we are dealing with this not as a matter of law but as a matter of expediency. I am not now challenging the non-intervention policy and I am not using the word "expediency" in a derogatory sense. I want to point out the basis on which we have to deal with this question. In connection with the Bilbao incident and in other cases in these Debates, the possibilities have been divided strictly into two, the first being that of insurgent and merchant ships on the high seas, and second that of insurgent and merchant ships in territorial waters. The Government divided these two classes of possibilities sharply and said, "As to the former, we give protection; as to the second we do not. What was the basis of their decision? I quote what was said by the Foreign Secretary on 14th April:
Surely the only possible criterion is whether or not certain action of ours constitutes intervention in the Spanish conflict.
On the same occasion the right hon. Gentleman said:
It can be argued—there are two if not more schools of thought among legal authorities on the question—that to take forcible action within Spanish territorial waters would amount to intervention."—[OFFICIAL REPORT 14th April, 1937; cols. 1137–1138, Vol. 322.]
But the right hon. Gentleman was in doubt about it. He said "it could be argued" that to go inside Spanish Territorial waters would be intervention. On that ground it was decided that it would be wrong to go into territorial waters and interfere with whatever an insurgent ship might be tempted to do there. The present Home Secretary, then First Lord of the Admiralty, spoke in the same sense and I have a recent quotation from the present First Lord of the Admiralty who was asked:
In view of the fact that General Franco does not enjoy belligerent rights how can it be held that he has any right to attempt to control British shipping inside or outside Spanish territorial waters?

The right hon. Gentleman said:
The question that really arises is not what are the rights of the rebel ships"—
That was very fortunate for the First Lord, because if he had had to deal with that question he would have found that they had no rights. He went on to say that the question which arose was:
what right His Majesty's Government have to take any action inside territorial waters."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 14th July, 1937; col. 1229, Vol. 326.]
I quite agree. The basis of the case is that it would be intervention for any of the Powers to enter into Spanish territorial waters and there to interfere with what the insurgents chose to do. Now, in the case that I am putting, of insurgent ships standing on the high seas and threatening to interfere with or sink British ships in territorial waters, you get this position, that a ship with no other legal status than that of a pirate is making use of the high seas, at a point opposite to territorial waters which it would be unable to enter by reason of the shore batteries of the Government, to sink a British ship. Is it intervention—I quite agree that it is intervention to go into Spanish territorial waters—to say to these ships with no rights at all, "We will not grant the right to use the high seas to sink our shipping?" Now I will turn to the answer of the present Home Secretary, to which all questioners have been referred in the last two or three weeks:
As has repeatedly been made clear to the House, as long as a British merchant ship remains on the high seas she would be protected by any British warship within call if she were fired upon or otherwise subjected to illegal interference by a Spanish warship. If, however, a British merchant ship enters Spanish territorial waters, she does so at her own risk.
Those words can represent a retreat from Government policy as laid down up till then. If the words "enters Spanish territorial water … at her own risk" mean at the risk of something happening to her in those territorial waters, it would be inexpedient for a British ship to interfere. I go with the Government there, but the policy which the Home Secretary went on to state was:
These conditions apply whether or not the Spanish warship is inside territorial waters.
Now that is a complete change, a complete departure. It is something which cannot be justified on the basis which


the Foreign Secretary has laid down as the one criterion, namely, whether it would be intervention. I think it was the hon. Member for Kingswinford (Mr. A. Henderson) who asked:
If it is permissible for an insurgent warship, which itself is outside territorial limits to fire upon a British ship which is just inside territorial limits, will this not render the protection of the British Fleet worthless"?
The Home Secretary replied, "No, Sir," and he added:
I do not admit the right of the insurgent warship to sink or attack a British ship in conditions of that kind.
Does that hold good? Is that the policy of the Government? Is that what the right hon. Gentleman really means, and if so, what is the meaning of the next words he uses, namely:
Within territorial waters, as the hon. Members knows, the utmost that a hostile ship can do would he to take the other ship into possession."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 21st April, 1937; cols. 1925–6; Vol. 322.]
What does that mean? We have tried to find out what that declaration means, and may I read some of the answers that we have received? The right hon. Member for Gorton (Mr. Benn) asked:
Suppose the Spanish insurgent ship is outside territorial waters and fires a shot at a British ship, what do our ships do then?
The First Lord of the Admiralty replied:
What I said remains the case, that the ship enters territorial waters at her own risk.
Mr. BENN: So that our ships would not interfere with an insurgent ship which has attacked a British ship from outside territorial waters?
Mr. COOPER: That is a hypothetical question.
HON. MEMBERS: "No.
Mr. COOPER: I made it perfectly plain that the protection of British ships does not, and never has extended to territorial waters. The question of whether an attack comes from inside or outside territorial waters is another point.
Mr. BENN: I must press the right hon. Gentleman. It is not a hypothetical case. A case occurred during the last few days. What does the British Navy do when a rebel ship fires outside territorial waters at a British ship inside territorial waters?
Mr. COOPER: If the enemy or the other side is in a position to capture a British ship inside territorial waters, and no other kind of attempt has been made, His Majesty Navy does not interfere?
Mr. BENN: Would the right hon. Gentleman kindly direct his attention to the ques-

tion that I asked. If, as recently happened, a rebel ship outside territorial waters fires at a British ship, what does the Navy do?
Mr. COOPER: I would remind the right hon. Gentleman that that case had not arisen. A foreign ship has not fired at a British ship."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 14th July, 1937; col. 1232; Vol. 326.]
One other question was asked by myself. It was:
Does the right hen. Gentleman mean the House to understand that a British warship will stand by and watch a British ship being hit by shells in those circumstances. Is that so or not? Can he tell us?
The First Lord of the Admiralty replied:
The position of a British warship, if the circumstances described by the hon. Member … were to arise, would certainly be extremely unpleasant."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 21st July, 1937; cols. 2174–5: Vol. 326.]
That is the answer of this strong, united, National Government that we are all to rely on to defend British economic and Imperial interests. It is the answer of a Government fundamentally unable to make up its mind. If a British ship enters Spanish territorial waters and an insurgent vessel, with no legal rights at all, anywhere, inside or outside territorial waters, fires a shot across the bows of the British ship, and the latter calmly carries on, and the insurgent ship then fires a shell which hits the British merchant ship, and clearly has the intention of firing further shells which will sink the British merchant ship, what does the British Navy do? Does it stand there and watch than happen? If the whole thing takes place inside Spanish territorial waters, I have said, and I say again, that I entirely understand that it is inexpedient, in view of Non-intervention Treaty, for our ships to go into what is virtually Spain, but if the insurgent ship is standing on the high seas, do we stand by and let it happen? On this last occasion will it be possible to have an answer to that question, "Yes" or "No"? Believe me, there are commanders of ships who will be very anxious to know exactly what will happen.

2.14 p.m.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Shakespeare): I do not think I need detain the House long. I am convinced that the hon. Member for Barnstaple (Mr. Acland) knows the answer to the question that he has put as well as does every other Member of the


House. There has never been any doubt about the policy of His Majesty's Government or about the policy which has been pursued by the Naval authorities from the very start. Indeed, the hon. Member quoted an answer of the late First Lord of the Admiralty in which that right hon. Gentleman made it perfectly plain that any British ship going into Spanish territorial waters did so at its own risk, and that the position would be just the same whether the threats came from a Spanish cruiser inside or from one outside those territorial waters. There is no doubt about that. It is the location of the ship that is the governing consideration. Then the hon. Gentleman went on to ask what the Navy would do if a Spanish warship outside territorial waters is exercising control against a ship which has defied warnings—

Mr. Benn: It has defied the British Admiralty.

Mr. Shakespeare: —which has not taken the advice given, and which decides that the risk is worth taking and tries to get in. There is no mystery about that. It is that case which is covered by the answer of the Prime Minister, who said that, although there were no belligerent rights on either side,
we are not prepared to intervene by force to prevent an attack by either party on a British merchant ship which has voluntarily placed herself within Spanish jurisdiction by entering Spanish territorial waters, provided"—
and this answers the hon. Gentleman—
that the capture is made with due regard to the universally recognised rules of naval warfare, which prohibit such practices as firing on a merchant ship before she is properly warned.…."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 19th July, 1937; col. 1760, Vol. 326.]
There is no dispute about it, and, as far as I know, no case has occurred where a warning has not been given. Indeed, it was made plain to the Spanish warships that in such cases warning must first be given.

Mr. Noel-Baker: Will the hon. Gentleman explain why there has been a total change from the policy pursued at Bilbao when, as the present Home Secretary, then the First Lord, said in answer to a question by the hon. Member for Kingswinford (Mr. A. Henderson), which the hon. Gentleman has just quoted:
We will not allow ships outside territorial waters to fire on ships inside territorial waters.

You now allow them to do so and to carry out the blockade by that means, although we have granted no belligerent rights.

Mr. Shakespeare: It is difficult to explain a change of policy when the hon. Gentleman has given the impression that the First Lord of the Admiralty said exactly the opposite of what he did say.

Mr. Noel-Baker: The hon. Member has just read it.

Mr. Shakespeare: Perhaps I may re-read it to the House, and the House can judge for itself. This is what the First Lord said on 21st April:
As long as a British merchant ship remains on the high seas she would be protected by any British warship within call if she were fired upon or otherwise subjected to illegal interference by a Spanish warship. If, however, a British merchant ship enters Spanish territorial waters she does so at her own risk. These conditions apply whether or not the Spanish warship is inside territorial waters."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 21st April, 1937; cols. 1725–6, Vol. 322.]
How can there, therefore, be a change of policy?

Mr. Noel-Baker: Will the hon. Gentleman notice what follows. The hon. Member for Kingswinford said:
If it is permissible for an insurgent warship which itself is outside territorial limits to fire upon a British ship which is just inside territorial limits, will this not render the protection of the British Fleet worthless?
Sir S. HOARE: No, Sir; I do not admit the right of the insurgent warship to sink or attack a British ship in conditions of that kind. Within territorial waters, as the hon. Member knows, the utmost that a hostile ship can do would be to take the other ship into possession."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 21st April, 1937; cols. 1725–6, Vol. 322.]
That is the policy which has been changed, and that is why there is a blockade being carried on to-day by action taken on the high seas.

Mr. Shakespeare: The hon. Gentleman is under a misapprehension. It is clear that the reply of the First Lord which he has just quoted governed the case of control being exercised without warning being given. The question arose, what would the British Navy do if effective control was being exercised from outside territorial waters without the necessary warning being given, and it was that case to which the First Lord replied? The position is perfectly plain.

Mr. Noel-Baker: At Bilbao there were cases where warning shots were fired and Spanish ships were told not to interfere.

Mr. Shakespeare: Only on the high seas. There was one case on the high seas, or perhaps two cases, where a Spanish warship sought to exercise control and our ships intervened. There has never been any doubt on the part of any one reading these questions, there has never been any doubt in the minds of the naval authorities in Spain who are carrying on a very difficult task, and no doubt so far as the Spanish warships or our merchant ships are concerned. All we say is that those who go inside territorial waters do so at their own risk and the blood is on their own heads.

Mr. Benn: May I ask this question. When the "MacGregor" was warned eight or nine shots were fired, some when she was within territorial waters, and some when she was on the high seas. Does the Admiralty admit the right after warning for the Spaniards to sink this refugee ship?

Mr. Shakespeare: The last warning shot was fired when the "MacGregor" was outside territorial waters. The exchange of telegrams shows that the Spanish insurgents might easily have taken control of the "MacGregor".

Mr. Benn: That is not an answer and the hon. Gentleman knows that it is not. The question is perfectly simple. After firing warning shots at the refugee ship, does the Admiralty say that the Spanish rebels have a right to sink it?

Mr. Shakespeare: The right hon. Gentleman need not get excited about it. If the Spanish insurgent vessel tried to exercise effective control over a ship inside territorial waters according to the well known rules, we have nothing further to say about it.

Mr. Benn: It may be sunk.

Mr. Shakespeare: If they disregard those rules, we should take action.

2.23 p.m.

Mr. Emmott: Now that the hon. Gentleman has given complete satisfaction to the hon. Member for Barnstaple (Mr. Acland) I propose to make a few remarks upon certain points that have been raised in the Debate by other hon. Members. I want first to make reference to an argument that was used by the right hon.
Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George). It has already been referred to by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, but I should like to add a word to what he said. In a passage of the right hon. Gentleman's remarks, which obviously indicated his sincere thoughts, the right hon. Gentleman urged the Government to abandon the present system of non-intervention. Declare neutrality, he said, and allow arms to be supplied to both sides. This passage has been the subject of comment by my right hon. Friend, but on account of the importance of the implications of the argument I beg leave to refer to the matter again. The right hon. Gentleman appeared to overlook the fact that the very conception of neutrality necessarily involves the concession of belligerent rights to both parties, and that it is impossible to permit the supply of arms to both sides without the concession of belligerent rights. I am not sure that the phrase "Non-Intervention" is not a little misleading, but if Non-Intervention were abandoned then the plain rule of international law would operate, and individuals—British citizens—would be permitted to supply arms at their own risk to the Government at Valencia, and to no one else. But the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs does not wish this, and, taking some account of reality, he urges the supply of arms not only to the Government at Valencia but to General Franco's forces. That however inevitably and necessarily involves, as cannot be too clearly insisted upon, the concession of belligerent rights.
In this part of his remarks the right hon. Member was arguing very strongly against the concession of belligerent rights, and he buttressed his argument by reference to the events which took place during the American Civil War. I believe the right hon. Gentleman was completely mistaken in the view that he presented to the House of those events. Attempting to find some support for his position in the circumstances of the American civil war he suggested—I did not take down his precise words, but I am sure that I do not misrepresent him—that our recognition of the Confederate States of America and our consequent concession of belligerent rights was in order to suit the convenience of the Government of the United States. His argument was that the real reason why we conceded


belligerent rights to the Confederate States was to meet the convenience of President Lincoln's Government. I think it is worth while to make clear to the House what actually were the events of that time. The year was 1861 and on the 17th April—I quote from a standard work on international law:
The President of the Southern States issued a Proclamation inviting applications for letters of marque and reprisal, and as at this period a large extent of coast was in the hands of the insurgents such an expectation of maritime hostilities might have been entertained as would have justified immediate recognition.
So on 17th April this proclamation was issued by the President of the Southern States. The author of this work goes on to say that:
The likelihood of maritime war was converted into a certainty by a Proclamation issued by President Lincoln on the 19th April, which declared the coast of the seceded States to be under blockade. Thus, when on the 14th May, a Proclamation of neutrality was issued by the British Government, twelve days after it had been received intelligence that the two American Proclamations had been put forth, the condition of affairs was—
and so on. I will not continue the quotation further for there the learned author merely sets out the position as it then existed. But I insist that so far is it from being true that our recognition of the Confederate States was made to suit the convenience of the Government, that the Government of the United States actually made our recognition of belligerency the subject of reiterated complaints. They objected by every means at their disposal to our recognition of the Confederate States. Therefore, the foundation upon which the right hon. Gentleman attempted to base that part of his argument is quite unsubstantial.
The right hon. Member for Limehouse (Mr. Attlee) quoted a passage from an authority on international law which suggested that the concession of belligerent rights would involve some kind of moral approval of the cause of one party in this conflict. That view is absolutely mistaken. The concession of belligerent rights is nothing more than the recognition of a state of fact, that recognition drawing after it certain legal consequences. It has nothing to do with any political or moral approval of the cause of either belligerent. Let me quote one or two passages which really set this whole question of the concession of belligerent rights

in its clearest light. The right hon. Member for Limehouse and the hon. Member for Barnstaple referred to General Franco's forces as being in the position of pirates. Does not that language, applied to General Franco's forces, border upon absurdity?

Mr. Acland: I was merely saying that those forces must have the legal position of pirates, that there is no other legal category into which they can fall. Either they must be granted belligerent rights and recognised, and that has not been done because of the foreign assistance they are receiving, or they must be in the only other legal category, which is that of pirates. I admit that for practical purposes one may have to treat differently what is going on with reference to territorial waters, but I should be very interested to hear if there is any other halfway house into which they might fall legally.

Mr. Emmott: I do not profess to speak as one of those inconvenient persons known as experts on international law, and I am not prepared to give the hon. Member an authoritative legal exposition of the position. If I misunderstood his argument I regret it, but I did think that it went a little beyond the pure law of the matter. At all events I am certain that in the Debates of the last few months the argument has gone beyond pure law, and has impinged upon the general political and ethical aspects of the question. Now Mr. Hall, in his work on International Law, says this:
As soon as a considerable population is arrayed in arms with the professed object of attaining political ends, it resembles a State too nearly for it to be possible to treat individuals belonging to such population as criminals.
In 1861, when the question was raised in connection with the American Civil War, Lord John Russell referred to an earlier declaration by the British Government in which it was laid down that
The character of belligerency was not so much a principle as a fact, that a certain degree of force and consistency acquired by any mass of population engaged in war entitled that population to be treated as a belligerent and, even if this title were questionable, rendered it the interest, well understood, of all civilised nations so to treat them.
I hope the House will allow me to supplement those passages by another passage, which comes a little later and in which Mr. Hall refers to the circumstances


which justify the concession of belligerent rights. Having discussed instances where no question of maritime warfare arises, he comes to the instance where maritime warfare may be involved. He says that in the case of maritime war the presumption of propriety lies in the direction of the concession of belligerent rights:
No circumstances can be assumed as probable in which the interests of a foreign State possessed of a mercantile marine will not be affected, and it may recognise the insurgent community, without giving just cause for a suspicion of bad faith, so soon as a reasonable expectation of maritime hostilities exists—
that passage is extremely relevant to our present situation—
or so soon as acts are done at sea by one party or the other which would be acts of war if done between States, unless it is evidently probable that the independent life of the insurgent government will be so short that the existence of war may be expected to interfere with the interests of the foreign State in a merely transient and unimportant manner.
When the situation is regarded in the light of those authoritative passages is it not, to put it mildly, the language of absurdity to describe as pirates, forces which control and contain within their allegiance 14,000,000 out of a population of 22,000,000, and which exercise jurisdiction over two-thirds of the territory of a State, and over its colonies?
There is one branch of the argument to which we listened to-day to which I wish to devote a few moments' critical attention. It has been repeatedly argued, and apparently assumed without detailed justification, that the system of non-intervention has been one-sided and has worked heavily against the Spanish Government. When the question is looked into more narrowly, it is seen that this is the direct contrary of the truth. The situation which exists at the moment works, in at least one respect, with great unfairness to General Franco. I am not now speaking as a partisan of General Franco but am attempting to state the actual position of affairs with all the fairness that I can. I mention two circumstances. Naval control is exercised at the present moment only in respect of territory under the jurisdiction of General Franco. Then, the whole of the coast under the jurisdiction of the Valencia Government, which was patrolled by the German and Italian navies, has for some time been open. Those are very formidable circumstances to set on the other

side of the scale; and my submission is that they go very far in themselves alone to disprove the assertion that non-intervention has generally during the period of its operation worked with partiality towards General Franco and with unfairness to the Spanish Government.
But I think the matter goes further. I ask hon. Members to consider what is in fact involved in the refusal of belligerent rights. Refusing, as we have, belligerent rights to General Franco, we have afforded protection on the high seas to British ships. But is not that in itself an act of positive disadvantage and damage to General Franco's forces? It is, as he himself has asserted, a kind of intervention. He has complained on more than one occasion that the actual system of non-intervention, involving refusal of belligerent rights, has operated as a kind of intervention against him. I am not of course at all accusing His Majesty's Government of partiality against General Franco, I am insisting upon the inevitable effect of the operation of the system of non-intervention, and I ask hon. Members to consider the matter in this light. Where an authority has sea power, is not the refusal of belligerent rights an act of damage to that authority? Take the kind of instance which has been frequent in recent months: ships carrying food from various ports have attempted to make their way into ports in the North West region of Spain. If General Franco, who is superior at sea to the Government of Valencia, had been conceded belligerent rights, he would have been in a position to exercise the right of visit and search against those ships, but the present policy has prevented him from doing so. I assert with confidence that the refusal of belligerent rights to an authority which exercises sea power is an act of positive damage to that authority. It comes in fact to this. We have been involved by the system of non-intervention in a position in which we have done the work of the Valencia Navy, or rather the work which ought to have been done by the Valencia Navy—and we all know the reasons why the naval forces under the control of the Valencia Government are in their present state of weakness and insubordination. I ask hon. Members to examine the matter from this aspect in all sincerity, and to put to themselves the question whether the operation of the system of non-intervention and the refusal


of belligerent rights does not work with unfairness, and with actual damage and disadvantage, to the authority that exercises sea power and has superiority at sea.
It has been stated very positively in this Debate that the whole system of nonintervention has definitely broken down. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Limehouse made that statement, and went on to demand that the matter should be entrusted for settlement to the League of Nations. But if the Governments concerned, and if the London Non-Intervention Committee, are unable to settle this most difficult and dangerous problem in a satisfactory manner, it is extremely unlikely that the League of Nations would be able to do so. I deny that the system of non-intervention has broken down. That positive statement supposes that the system has been of no effect at all. I deny that. The system of non-intervention has been effective in preventing the supply to either party in the Spanish conflict of large quantities of material and equipment which would otherwise have reached them. To a relative extent, the system of non-intervention has achieved success. Absolute success it has certainly not achieved. But this absolute statement that the system has broken down can mean only that the system has achieved no useful result. With that proposition I entirely disagree.
At this moment, however, it is certainly true that we have to contemplate the possibility of failure of agreement in the Committee upon the proposals which are before it. If that happens, if there is no agreement on the proposals submitted to the Governments by His Majesty's Government, we shall be faced, as the Foreign Secretary has said, with a new situation. What possibilities does the new situation contain? It contains, first, the possibility of substituting for the present system the old system of neutrality. That is the course which has been urged upon the Government to-day by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George), who apparently desires the supply of arms to both sides, under the old system of neutrality. But is there not another possibility, a definite and practical possibility, as I think, in the new situation which may arise? Hitherto in this Debate it seems to have been assumed that if the system of non-inter-

vention, that is to say, the policy of refusing to supply material to either side, is discontinued, it must be superseded by the old rule of neutrality, under which individuals would be free to supply arms to both sides in Spain at their own risk. Would it not be possible, however, to concede belligerent rights, adopting, of course, the policy of neutrality, but to combine that position with a continuance of our policy of refusing to supply arms and material to either party in the Spanish conflict? I do not see why that should not be possible, and, if there is to be any further intervention in the Debate on behalf of the Government, I should be very much obliged if we could be told whether there is any impossibility in that position, or any reason why it should not be adopted. Is it not possible to combine the system of neutrality, involving belligerent rights, with the refusal to supply arms to both parties in Spain? Is it not possible to combine that old, well recognised feature of international law with what I admit would be a new departure in it?
Finally, I am certain that the great majority of the House will agree with me when I say that we are prepared to leave to His Majesty's Government complete liberty to deal with the situation as it will develop in the next few weeks. We are prepared with the utmost confidence to entrust the Government with full liberty to meet each new development of the situation as it arises. We do not desire in any way to tie the hands of the Government, or to extract from them any pledge that in any particular circumstances they will summon Parliament to consider the policy which they have in mind. We gladly grant the Government full liberty to deal with any new situation that may arise, in the confident conviction that our affairs during the next few weeks will be managed with all that skill with which they have been managed in recent months.

2.50 p.m.

Lieut.-Commander Fletcher: I had intended this afternoon to draw attention to two points—first, the degree of virulent intensity to which foreign, and especially Italian, anti-British propaganda has grown; and, secondly, the damage which has been and is being done to our interests by foreign controlled and subsidised news agencies. As time presses,


I propose to deal only with the second of these two points, and do so the more gladly because I understand that efforts are being made at the present moment to get our relations with Italy on a happier and more satisfactory footing and also that Italy has lately given some assurances with regard to propaganda, with special reference to the Report of the Palestine Commission.
I think there is abundant evidence to show that there is a real danger of our influence in world affairs being diminished because we are doing nothing to combat the situation that is being created by foreign countries subsidising their news agencies and news services, and so enabling them to pour out news coloured to their own purposes at a ridiculously low cost. To compete with this our news agencies ought to have access to cheap radio transmission or to cheap cable rates comparable with the charges for radio transmission. Apparently our news agencies are compelled to stick to cable communications because considerations of Imperial Defence are involved. Apparently we are reluctant to commit ourselves to radio because radio might be jammed in time of war, and there is, of course, a great deal of force in that contention; but countering hostile propaganda is equally a matter of Defence. Why must those concerned with disseminating British news be denied cheap radio transmission and be mulcted in order that these cable communications may be maintained? Portugal, Italy, France, Germany, Holland, Argentina, Japan, China and the United States of America all provide cheap radio transmission for their own and in some cases for foreign news agencies. Some of these countries sell transmission virtually on a time basis, although the charges may be worked out so as to make it appear that they are based on wordage rather than on time. These countries are increasingly using the news services to forward their own domestic and foreign policies, and we in turn ought to set up machinery for putting our home, Commonwealth and foreign policies before the world.
There was a time when the British news services were supreme all over the international field, but to-day our news services are swamped by these subsidised foreign services. For instance, Reuters used to be supreme in North and South

America, both for British and for foreign news, but now they have as competitors, Havas in France, D.N.B. in Germany, Stefani in Italy, and Tass in Russia, and these agencies flood Europe, the Near East, the Far East, Africa and South America with Government subsidised radio news services. As the Governments concerned subsidised these news services, they are, of course, able to compel them to put their home news in a favourable light, while news affecting other countries, especially our own, is tinctured and put forward in an unfavourable light.
Take the case of the Far East alone. Before the War, practically all the news reaching the Far East reached it through Reuters, to the great advantage of British trade and prestige. Now there are French and German news organisations competing which cannot possibly be run on a commercial basis and only survive because they are subsidised. These and similar services are deliberately used to the detriment of this country. In South America, United States agencies give subsidised services in great volume owing to the special rates conceded by the United States cable services. I should like to give one or two instances of the harm done in this way by these subsidised news agencies.
One is an instance of a statement issued in Japan that this country had agreed to allow Soviet Russia to build up a fleet equal to the Japanese Fleet. That was done for no other purpose than to make bad relations between ourselves and Japan. Then again I have a quotation from secret instructions which were issued by the German propaganda department to its agents abroad. These instructions are that they are "to throw discredit on news agencies which are hostile to Germany, and, above all, to damage as much as possible the relations between these hostile agencies and important foreign newspapers." The instructions given in regard to this are extremely clear. They say that "all disturbances created in the good relations existing between other States is indirectly to the advantage of Germany. All ousting of the news of foreign agencies is a great gain to Germany." Those are instructions issued by the official German Propaganda Department. Then again, during the period of these strained relations that we had with Italy over the Sanctions policy,


a foreign news agency issued the following to the Japanese Press:
London. The British General staff, it is understood, is more worried than ever over the state of Egypt, Malta and the Suez Canal, now encircled by Italian troops, while the Duce's fleet is mobilised for action within striking distance of the British Mediterranean Armada. With revolt fermenting in Palestine and discontent rife in Egypt, uneasiness is growing daily all over the Mediterranean and British soldiers, sailors and civilians stationed in the area are reported to he speculating as to what move Italy is planning to take next.
That is a news item given out in order to convey an impression of British fear, timidity, weakness, perplexity and vaccilation. That is given out for the benefit of Chinese and Japanese readers. News items of that sort go out increasingly from foreign agencies. Are we really to believe that our prestige remains unaffected? These foreign services are tendentious. At the same time they are full, they are comprehensive, they are well compiled and well edited and cost only a fraction of the equivalent British services. They systematically decry and damage our interests and they make British presentation of foreign news difficult, inconspicious and ineffective. Let us look for a moment at the state of affairs in South America. The countries there are of vast importance to us, and to our trade in the future. The Prince of Wales called attention to this matter in 1931. He said:
All news from England to Latin America is transmitted by non-British agencies. The Latin-American reader sees us and our affairs through spectacles which are neither ours nor those of his own country. I sincerely hope that some means can be found to increase the volume of purely British news in South America.
Reuters responded to that appeal. They established a daily news service for South America in response to the appeal of the Prince of Wales. They persisted in it for three years in spite of making very heavy financial losses, but finally they had to give it up because of subsidised competing services. Thanks to French official facilities Havas is transmitting 15,000 words a day, including British news as seen through and distorted by French eyes. The only British news service in Brazil at the present moment is a partial one picked up from the air by one newspaper. All other foreign news in Brazil is received either through the

United States of America or through France.
Naturally these agencies are not particularly interested in the British point of view or British news. I feel sure that it is time something was done to counter this state of affairs. British news is not only put into the background, but such news as does go through is, not too conspicuously but ingeniously, distorted to our discredit and to our harm. The Foreign Office and the Post Office and the B.B.C. and certain selected journalists who have knowledge of this subject and have foreign experience should, I think, get into conference on the matter and see what can be done. I feel that the Foreign Office should bestir itself to the danger of what is going on and should call in experts to study the matter and discuss what can be done in each area affected to nullify the poisonous effect of these new services.
Again, the Foreign Office persists in its old-fashioned ideas in the staffing of our Missions abroad. Some of the not very hard worked and certainly not overworked secretaries might with great advantage be replaced by what are prime necessities of modern international intercourse, viz., Press Attachés and Commercial Secretaries specially charged with watching propaganda. A vast amount of information lies available to the Foreign Office if they will only avail themselves of it and consult British journalists abroad on this subject. I feel reluctant to ask the Foreign Secretary to take into consideration yet one more matter when so much lies on his shoulders and when he must be looking forward to a holiday, at any rate from the Parliamentary side of his duties. I think the Spanish section in the Foreign Office especially must be looking forward to a holiday. They have been very hard worked and have had little if any leave and, I am sure, deserve warm commendation. But I suggest that this matter is one of real importance to the country and also of very great importance to our great and valuable Press and news agencies' interests. I hope, therefore, that it may receive some attention.

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

3.4 p.m.

Mr. Clement Davies: I do not desire to follow the hon. and gallant Gentleman who has just spoken in the very interest-


ing topic he has raised, nor do I desire to raise any matter of foreign policy. I want to direct the attention of the House to a matter which concerns us at home, that is, the administration of justice in this country. I regret that I have to use this occasion to raise this very important matter, because it is an occasion upon which unfortunately one cannot go into it in the detail one would like. One cannot suggest, for example, the necessary legislation that must be involved in trying to remedy the position as it is to-day, but most of the matters, I believe all the matters, with which I shall deal can be remedied by Orders-in-Council, or merely by Rules of the Court. I want to make it quite clear that in anything that I say to-day I do not in any way criticise a single one of His Majesty's judges. The prestige, the reputation for integrity and the ability of His Majesty's judges were never deservedly higher than they are to-day. I make no apology for quoting words which I myself used in a report of the Commission when I said:
These men cannot be expected indefinitely to maintain their position solely by virtue of their personal merits and the incomparable jurisprudence which it is their privilege and pleasure to administer. There must always be three distinct elements in the administration of justice in all civilised communities, first the jurisprudence, which is the subject, of course, of administration and legislation, secondly, the men, the judges upon whose shoulders the burden of that administration rests, and thirdly, the machinery whereby the judges strive to effect the administration of justice.
It is with that third matter that I desire to deal. The Lords' delays have always been the subject of comment and complaint, I believe almost from time immemorial. I need only cite Shakespeare and Charles Dickens. It is the uncertainty, the high costs, the long waiting period and the anxiety about which complaint is made, and made from generation unto generation, so much so that, to quote the words of one witness who gave evidence before the Commission which sat from 1934 to 1936, it is no wonder that the public of this country shun the law like the plague and prefer to suffer injustice rather than resort to it. Another man, Lord Maugham, and Mr. Justice Branson described the condition of things by the hard adjective of scandalous. Those are men of experience talking about the machinery of the law with

which they have to deal day in and day out, and yet nothing is being done.
I had the privilege of serving upon the Peel Commission to inquire into the causes of these delays. We were appointed in December, 1934. We sat week by week. We considered innumerable documents. Memoranda were sent to us by all kinds of persons from all parts of the country. Altogether we examined 71 witnesses and we issued a report some 130 pages long giving our carefully considered opinion. After we had issued it I do not know what has happened. I suppose it has been pigeon-holed and put away, like the reports of other commissions. Why call upon us to waste our time in going through all those details, if no attention whatever is to be paid to what we report? We were all busy men. There were three judges, I think there were two K.C's. I myself was the one man engaged in business. The only time we could meet was in the evenings so that we might go about our ordinary avocations in the day. We spent evening after evening listening to witnesses and going through documents, and all that has happened, as far as I can gather, is that two committees have since been appointed, one to consider the anomalies of the jurisdiction of quarter sessions, and the other to consider circuits. As far as I know, no report has come from either committee, but one mighty thing has emerged. I understand that next October every judge will have a shorthand writer sitting by his side. That is all that has happened.
We are not alone in the way in which our report has been ignored. We were the seventh commission or committee that had been appointed to consider, in the main, these very matters, In 1892 there was a commission appointed to consider a drastic alteration of circuits. In 1908 a very important commission was appointed under the late Lord Gorel, who has been dead for over 25 years. In 1909 there was a committee of judges, and in 1913 there was a long commission sitting under Lord St. Albans, and from the evidence that was given before that commission and the report of the commissioners themselves, we had a lot of confirmatory evidence that the very things that were happening then were happening now. In 1922 there was another committee under Mr. Justice Rigby Swift,


in 1932 Lord Hanworth and his committee sat, and in 1934 Lord Peel and Lord Hanworth and the other seven commissioners sat. Taken on the law of averages, the sands of time are running out and it is about time to appoint another commission to inquire into the very same things that were inquired into over a long period.
For centuries the State has rightly claimed the monopoly of the administration of justice. Arbitrations only some 120 years ago were regarded as illegal, and if you had an agreement to enter into an arbitration, that agreement was regarded by His Majesty's judges as one which offended against public policy. If the State claims a monopoly in the administration of justice, then it should administer justice quickly and cheaply as well as fairly. About the impartiality and fairness of the judges there is no complaint, but about the cost and the uncertainty and the long delays there is continued complaint. There should be one guiding rule for the State, and that is, that if there is to be expense with regard to the administration of justice, it should fall upon the State and not upon the litigant. If you have a dispute with your fellow men, there ought to be provided a machinery by which you can get that dispute settled quickly and cheaply. What is the practice to-day? The administration of justice costs nothing to the State. Taken as a whole, the total revenue that is obtained is greater than the actual expenditure. Small as the fees are which are paid on writs, and which are paid during the course of a litigation, the total amount is enough to pay the judges, their clerks and the officials and even to renovate and keep up the buildings. That comes out of the pockets of the litigants.
We scarcely ever get an opportunity of discussing this position, because all that happens is that we get a token Vote brought before the House, for the very good reason that the revenue which is received by the State exceeds the expenditure. The position is so vast that it is difficult to confine oneself within reasonable limits in dealing with it. I will, however, do my best. In 1935 an Act was passed increasing the number of judges. Might I, in passing, say that a little over 100 years ago there were, I think, 14 judges of the King's Bench

Division, and by the Act of 1935 the number was increased from 18 to 20. But provision was made in that Act that if two vacancies occurred those vacancies should not be filled, so that the permanent number of judges we have is 18, with a population something like three times as large as it was 100 years ago. Even taking it simply on the basis of population we require something like 36 judges, but no application has been made to fill the two vacancies which have occurred, and to-day our judges are not up to the full quota which they might be under the Act which this House passed.
There seems to be some extraordinary feeling that if a judge loses five minutes of his time, somehow or other the whole British Constitution will come to an end. He must be occupied from 10.30 in the morning until 4 or 4.15 in the afternoon. Because he is kept there all that time litigants must be kept there for hours and days, with their witnesses, and juries must also be kept lest, perchance, the judge might be unoccupied for five minutes. Think of the cost. The cost to the State if a judge went away for a whole day and had nothing to do would not amount to more than £15 gross, but it would amount to less than that. What happens under the present system? In order that a judge may be occupied, not one case but two, three or even four cases are put in his list. The first case is called at 10.30 in the morning and it may be likely to last the whole day, or even a second or third day. But are the parties in the second, third and fourth cases allowed to go away? No, they must stay there, hour after hour arid day after day, lest their case should be called upon, lest the first case should collapse and the judge find himself with nothing to do for half an hour, or it may be an hour. If he took the afternoon off, he would be a better judge for it the next morning, but he must not do so. Therefore, the parties and the witnesses must be kept there and the juries must be kept there. What must be the cost of that to the State? What must be the cost of men taken away from their ordinary work—juries, parties, witnesses. Count up what they cost for a clay. It must amount to hundreds of pounds.
The position has become intolerable. The ideal system would be one under which a day would be fixed for the hear-


ing of a case, and the case heard upon that day. This ideal has been achieved in three instances—in the Admiralty Court, in the Commercial Court, and for the last few years in what is known as the New Procedure List. Let me give an instance from the Commercial Court, with which the Attorney General and myself were familiar in days gone by. What happens? A writ is issued and two days later an application is made to the judge of the Commercial Court. He will hear the application, make the orders, take complete charge of the case, and fix a day for hearing. On that day the case will be heard and disposed of. Unfortunately, that court deals only with a certain class of cases. Obviously, the same thing can be done in the Admiralty Court, which deals only with ships and the conditions of shipping. In the New Procedure List you can get your case fixed for trial in about one month or six weeks from the date of the issue of the list, and we have been told by Mr. Justice Horridge that in no single instance had the court failed to dispose of the case on the day on which it had been fixed to come on. Why have a new procedure and an old procedure? Why, as one judge has put it, have a good procedure and a bad procedure? Why not have one complete procedure putting all litigants on the same basis?
Let me come to the case of London. One would have expected that London would receive first consideration. Here we have within 25 miles radius of the Law Courts in the Strand between 10,000,000 and 11,000,000 people. The tendency is to bring not only cases within the area of London to be tried in London but, if they are important, to bring them from the provinces and avoid the rush and crush which often happen on circuit. Yet London instead of having first consideration is put last. The circuits receive first consideration, then certain special courts, the Central Criminal Court, the Court of Criminal Appeal, the Divisional Court, and Chambers must be filled. What happens? I have looked at the daily list for the last months. During the whole of July there were only five judges of the King's Bench Division in London, and some of them were occupied upon special work. I understand that no jury cases have been summoned since

10th June. The position of the list today is that there are 171 non-jury cases and 130 of them had been set down for trial before April.
I hope the House appreciates what is meant by "setting down for trial." It means that the parties are ready to have the case tried the very next day after they set it down. One hundred and thirty out of 171 were ready for trial before April. With special juries, there are 81, 12 having been set down before April. With common juries there are 100, 50 having been set down before April. There is a total of nearly 200 cases which have been waiting for trial since last March. Since then there has been the delay of April, May, June and July, and to-day the judges go away for a well-earned rest of 2½ months. Therefore, there will be at least 6½ months delay before the cases come on for trial, and when the judges come back on 12th October they will immediately be sent off again on their travels round the circuits. I do not know when these cases will be disposed of.
Again, what happens in London? There are those long absences of the judges, and one tries to make arrangements with one's clients. They ask what they are to do. Suppose a client is fiftieth on the list, and there is not a judge in London to take the case. The client may want to go to the Continent, or even to America, on business, and he asks whether it is safe for him to do so. Looking at the list and considering the absence of judges, one says, "Yes, it is perfectly safe for you to go." But then the circuit list collapses, and the judges rush back to London, travelling overnight, having wired to say that they are coming. Ten or 12 judges may be back in London in one day, and each one of them is assigned four cases, which makes 48 cases, and one's client comes in the list next day. But he is in Paris on business. What is one to do? All that can be done is to approach the other side and make the best settlement possible. I am in favour of settlements at all times, but not of settlements which are forced settlements, because they leave rankling dissatisfaction that is never eradicated from the minds of either party. That is the position.
Is it to be wondered that for a long time now the commercial community have put in their contracts a clause which may be


translated as follows: "If any dispute arises under this contract, in no circumstances whatsoever will we go before one of His Majesty's Judges"? That is what it amounts to, although it reads, "Any disputes under this contract shall be referred to arbitration." What does that mean? They do not go to arbitration because it is more satisfactory or less expensive. It is more unsatisfactory. The arbitrator does not know how to weigh up the evidence, he is not an expert and it is much more expensive, because the arbitrator will often charge excessive fees for sitting, and usually there are three arbitrators. Nevertheless, the commercial community prefer to go to them, and to put up with an unsatisfactory award, merely because they sit on a day which is convenient to everybody. That is why that Clause is being put in all contracts, and that is why the courts are so unpopular.
I wish now to deal with the circuits. At the present time, the judges go to 61 circuit towns, some of them small and some of them large. I do not want to stop a judge going to any town which he has been in the habit of visiting, but at the present time there are over 30 towns with over 100,000 inhabitants which have never seen a "red" judge. It is essential for the well-being of the community that the "red" judge should be seen from time to time, and that the magistrate should observe the way in which he does his work. It is about time that he went to Sheffield, Hull, Bradford, Plymouth, and all the big towns that have never seen him. Yet some of the smaller towns in Wales get a "red" judge twice a year. I do not want to derive the small towns of that privilege, but I do not see why the judges should not go to the larger towns. It is specially important now, because of the way justice is administered. We were told by Mr. Justice Horridge that in the case of young prisoners he always wanted to see the parents or the friends. Just imagine the expense which that may involve. We were told that when the Assizes were held at Leeds, a train left Hull every morning filled with witnesses, parties to cases, jurors, and so on. If the court adjourned in time, they returned to Hull that night, but if not, they have to go to the expense of staying the night in Leeds. What would be the expense involved if the judge went to Hull? He

could go in his motor car from Leeds and deal with the cases there.
Another thing is that on circuit Judges often sit abnormal hours trying to get through the work. A judge fixes the day of his arrival at the first circuit town and he fixes the dates for the succeeding circuit towns. The judges must do their best to keep to this arrangement and in order to do so they will sometimes sit from 10 o'clock in the morning until seven or eight o'clock in the evening and even nine o'clock in the evening. I have known a judge sit until 11 o'clock, and the late Lord Hanworth told me that his great-grandfather once wrote to his great-grandmother at three o'clock in the morning, saying that he had just summed up to a jury in a murder trial, and had never been clearer in his life. I described it as a scandal. I was glad to note that another great judge had once said to Lord Justice Vaughan Williams that "little justice was done by candle light."
The judge may be able to stand these long sittings, but what about the prisoners and the witnesses which have to go through periods of anxiety in an atmosphere about which they know nothing before they come into it? How can a man do justice to himself who has been sitting in a court from 10 o'clock in the morning when he is called to the witness box at eight or nine o'clock at night? These long sittings are not desired by the judges, but they must get through the work and sometimes they have to call upon a King's Counsel to help them by taking some of the cases, and then, if they cannot get through the work, they send for us and they do what we on circuit know only too well. They "smash the list" as it is called, by using their persuasive powers to induce litigants to settle and thus get rid of the cases, but as I have already said a forced settlement cannot be a good settlement. I had also wished to refer to the anomalies of quarter sessions and county courts and to the tremendous cost of documents and printing, but I hope I shall have another opportunity of raising those matters. I hope I have said enough to show that the administration of justice in this country is not what it ought to be.

Mr. Gallacher: On a point of Order. In view of the fact that it has been found impossible to call me in the Debate upon


Spain, am I to take it that there is a non-intervention policy to keep me out?

Mr. Speaker: That does not seem to be a point of Order.

3.35 p.m.

The Attorney-General (Sir Donald Somervell): I am grateful to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Montgomeryshire (Mr. C. Davies) for having raised the matters with which he dealt first, because they are of great importance, and secondly because it will enable me, I hope, to remove some of the misapprehensions which, I think, exist in his mind. First of all, he drew a picture of conditions which existed in the past and suggested that nothing had been done, but I do not think that that is quite a fair statement of the case. In my own experience at the Bar, I know that effective steps were taken to deal with at any rate some of the matters to which he referred. He referred to the new procedure list. As an individual who, while I was in private practice, took some part in consultations with regard to that list, or the steps which led to it, I think it is not at all accurate to suggest that those concerned with the administration of justice have done nothing to try and deal with the evils to which my hon. and learned Friend referred. It is obvious that the fact that the law's delays have been referred to throughout history shows that the problem is a difficult one. It is one which has baffled previous generations, and no doubt, if you have a case of any complexity and the parties are unable to settle it in the spirit of conciliation, but desire it to be tried out, with full evidence and arguments on each side, before a judge, it is a matter which almost inevitably must involve time, expense, and anxiety. Some of the instances to which he referred make it very difficult to produce a state of affairs in which all the objections would disappear.
Now I will come to what is really the basis of his speech, the Royal Commission, on which he himself sat, and I would like to dispel completely and effectively the suggestion that that report has been pigeon-holed and that nothing has been done under it. My hon. and learned Friend referred to three committees. The setting of those committees was recommended by the Commission itself. It recommended that a small committee

should be set up to review the claims of towns that want assizes, and it recommended that a small expert committee should be set up on quarter sessions. Therefore, in setting up those committees, my noble Friend was not in any way delaying, but was carrying out the suggestions made by the Commission. Those committees were set up, and my hon. and learned Friend said he did not know whether they had reported. It may be that other matters have detracted from his interest in these things since he actually served on the Commission, but the fact is that the Circuit Towns Committee reported in August, 1936, and the Quarter Sessions Committee in July, 1936, and the reports were presented to Parliament. My hon. and learned Friend also referred to the Shorthand Writers' Committee. That matter is in hand, as he knows, and we hope it will come into operation next October.
Those committees reported, and it was not until they had reported that we had a complete picture. If anybody interested in this matter cares to go through the recommendations of the Royal Commission, summarised on pages 103 to 106 of their report, he will find that a number of these matters involve legislation and a number of them do not. Certain things have been done, but I want to present a broad picture to the House. It may be said, Why did you not do the things which do not require legislation, without waiting for the things which do require legislation? One or two minor matters have been dealt with, such as the shorthand writers matter, but the thing is not quite so simple as all that, because, as I am sure my hon. and learned Friend would be the first to admit, to a very large extent the recommendations hang together. For instance, you do not want to increase circuit facilities until you have brought into operation the recommendation by which time on circuit can be examined. Although it is not true of all of them that they are interlocked in that way, it is true to say that a large number of these matters are interlocked and ought to come into operation together.
With regard to those matters which involve legislation, it is out of Order to discuss them to-day, but I do not think it could be trespassing against that rule if I gave the House an assurance that those matters which require legislation have been under active consideration and have


reached the stage when it is hoped to take decisions on them shortly and to present a Bill to Parliament. I am not saying that all these recommendations have been adopted, because the time to consider them will be when the decisions have been taken and the Bill is before the House, but they are under active consideration and decisions have been taken on a number of them. I would refer particularly to what I agree, and have long felt, is one of the vital things in this matter, namely, the fixing of days. With regard to this matter and the other matters which are mostly set out on page 105 of the Report, I am in a position to tell the House that not only have they been considered, but draft rules are already in being, and are under consideration by His Majesty's Judges and others concerned with a view to getting them in proper form and bringing them into operation as soon as possible. There, again, I am not saying that they cover every point, but decisions have been taken on a number of points and draft rules are being considered, in particular with regard to the recommendations in 2 (1), namely, to extend the system of fixing dates as far as it is possible.
That gives a general conspectus of the position and I hope it will relieve my hon. and learned Friend's mind. I am not complaining of anything he said, because I appreciate the very natural feeling of some one like himself who has given up many hours and given hard work to the problem. I agree that there has been a long period of silence, but things have been going on in the way of researches of sub-committees, a consideration of their recommendations, and the putting into proper form of the recommendations of the Commission. There is another point on which my hon. and learned Friend will agree with me, and that is that when we are dealing with matters of legal procedure it is much easier to see the general line on which reform is desirable than to translate that into actual day to day rules of procedure. I agree with the main point my hon. and learned Friend raised with regard to the hardship inflicted and the waste of time when, witnesses and others are kept hanging about. I think that perhaps he did not give enough notice to the fact that His Majesty's judges are aware of the hardship, and, within my own knowledge, in many cases, when it becomes obvious

that a case will not be reached, it is released. Provision has to be made for cases being settled unexpectedly, and it may be that what my hon. and learned Friend says is right, that in some cases too much attention is paid to the possibility of a judge finishing his work before the end of the day. The real answer to that problem probably is the extension of the system of fixing of days because that in itself does involve information being got as to the length of a case and so on. It is hoped that that particular inconvenience will be diminished.
The hon. and learned Member spoke about London, and it is true to say that London has many advantages, but both in regard to the circuits and London it is hoped that the position of affairs will be very much improved under the rules which have been considered. My hon. and learned Friend referred to certain cases which had been set down for equity, and I am not saying that at the moment there may not be a number of cases which, under an improved system, would not have been tried some time ago, but it is not accurate to say that when a case is set down it is always ready to be heard. From my own experience I know there are many instances in which a case may have been set down for some weeks, and in which if it happens that one of the judges should come back rather earlier than had been expected, the solicitors turn up and ask for the case to be postponed because they are not ready. In regard to new circuit towns, the sub-committee recommended both Sheffield and Newport as new circuit towns, and steps have been taken to communicate that decision to them with a view to their providing the necessary buildings.
My hon. and learned Friend said that his remarks were in no sense a criticism of His Majesty's Judges, and I should like to associate myself with that and to assure him and the House of the interest of His Majesty's Judges in this matter. In particular the Lord Chief Justice, who is head of the King's Bench division, is more alive than any of us, because of his contact with the work, to the fundamental importance of making the machinery as expeditious and convenient to the public as possible. So far as my noble Friend is concerned from what I have said the House will appreciate that


the matters to which my hon. and learned Friend has referred have been under his active consideration, and that very considerable progress has been made towards putting, at any rate, a considerable number of them into practice. I am in full and complete agreement with the main object which my hon. and learned Friend has at heart in raising the matter, namely, that our system of judicial procedure may be made as prompt, as expeditious, as convenient and as uncostly as circumstances will permit.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

3.48 p.m.

Mr. Gallacher: I have been trying for a considerable time to take part in the Debate, in order to draw attention to the classic self-exposure of the Foreign Secretary in his favourite policy this afternoon. He has tried to make use of M. Blum. Anyone who has paid any attention to the speech made by M. Blum will see that he was simply trying to justify a policy which had been forced upon him. But I am not much concerned with the statement of M. Blum, but with the statement of the Foreign Secretary on the policy he has pursued. He told us that, when the revolt broke out there was no doubt that a large quantity of arms had been supplied to Franco, and said that gave the balance or advantage to Franco. When Franco had got the balance of advantage, the Foreign Secretary operated the policy of non-intervention which prevented the Spanish Government from getting any arms.
The Foreign Secretary said that the international brigade had defended Madrid. Let me say here that nobody can dispute the clear character of volunteer attaching to the international brigade. No Government sent them; they were there as volunteers. The Foreign Secretary said that the brigade came into Madrid and assisted in its defence, and so there was a balance. What did the Foreign Secretary do when the balance was, according to this regained? The balance was regained because of the volunteers; the Foreign Secretary then stopped volunteers. He does not stop the conscripts from going into Franco, but he is concerned with volunteers going to support the Government; thus is the balance once again upset in favour of Franco. The Government and the Foreign Secretary have not fol-

lowed a shilly-shallying or un-thought-out policy, but a flagrant policy of preventing the Spanish Government from defeating the rebels. It would riot have been difficult for the Spanish Government to do so. Franco had the support of Germany and Italy, but even with their limited supplies the Spanish Government would have finished the rebels, if non-intervention had not been operated, and if the Spanish Government could have got the necessary material to drive the rebels out of Spain.
The Foreign Secretary and the Government cannot deny that the volunteers in the international brigade, which played such a heroic part in the early stages of the fighting while the Spanish Government's army was being reorganised out of completely raw material, are part of the Spanish army. No one outside Spain has any control of any kind over them. That brigade belongs to the Spanish Government. The armaments, aeroplanes and other equipment on the side of the Spanish Government belong to the Spanish Government. On the other hand, I challenge the Foreign Secretary or any representative of the Government to say that the German divisions and aeroplanes or the Italian divisions, aeroplanes or tanks belong to Franco. The Foreign Secretary knows, even though hon. Members behind him do not know—I am satisfied that hon. Members who support the Government never know very much, or they would not support the policy pursued by their Front Bench—that the German divisions and air forces in Spain are under the control of and are directed by the German high command and that the Italian divisions and air forces belong to the Italian Government and are directed by the Italian high command.
To talk about granting belligerent rights to General Franco in those circumstances is simply to play about with terms. If belligerent rights are granted to Franco, that is granting belligerent rights to Germany and Italy in the Mediterranean. There is much talk about not doing anything to extend the war or the possibilities of war, but suppose that you have an incident like that of the "Deutschland," when the Prime Minister got particularly distressed—he gets very distressed at the poverty of Members of this House, but apparently he is not


much distressed about the poverty of old age pensioners—he got particularly distressed about the seamen who were killed on the "Deutschland," but there was never a solitary word about the men, women and children who were butchered the following day by the "Deutschland," about the hundreds of children who were blown to pieces while walking at their mothers' sides. Did the Prime Minister or the Foreign Secretary express regret for that? No. If you grant belligerant rights to Franco, which means granting belligerent rights to Germany and Italy, and if you have incidents of that kind, you are rushing right on to the path to general war by granting belligerent rights. I appeal to hon. Members opposite not to give the Foreign Secretary or the Government any encouragement in that regard.
With regard to the Far East, I should like to express the hope that the great masses of the Chinese people in all parts of China will unite and drive the Japanese aggressor out of China. No question should exist anywhere as to the criminal

role which the Japanese played in Manchuria, and are now playing in China, and I hope that all Chinese men and women will unite in order to achieve the liberation of China from the terror that is now stalking in the land.

3.57 p.m.

Mr. Henderson Stewart: I had intended expressing a complaint on behalf of a great many of the people of Scotland with regard to the time allotted to the discussion of Scottish affairs in this House, but unfortunately, owing to the fact that the Spanish question has monopolised the greater part of the Debate to-day, it will not be possible for me to do that. I would like, however, to ask you, Mr. Speaker, if you will at some future time give me an opportunity of addressing the House on that matter?

Question, "That this House do now adjourn," put, and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at Two Minutes before Four o'Clock, until Thursday, 21st October, pursuant to the Resolution of the House this day.